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INDTRODUCTION 
 
The history of the interrelation of sources of international law dates back to ancient times. 
International law has existed since organized communities started dealing with one another 
consistently.1 However, what has changed is the definition and meaning of the term 
“international”. For instance, the ancient Egyptians or Greeks would have a much narrower 
understanding of the term “international” compared to that of nowadays, reflecting the world 
as they knew it.2  
The earliest sources of international law such as peace treaties and customs have been in 
meaningful interrelation since ancient times. Mostly peace treaties were applied by invoking 
customs to regulate armed conflicts and make the peace between City-States and various 
nations.3 The customary law has always derived from the rules of positive morality and treaties 
either have always been concluded based on the rules of positive morality.4 Both these sources 
– treaties and customs have reflected power relations in the international community. 
Contrary to this widely accepted approach, some authors had different opinions regarding the 
interrelationship of a custom and a treaty in international law. Alberico Gentili and Hugo 
Grotius are classical examples. Even in their analyses of  the law of war, they clearly expressed 
that customary law could not be a source of international law.5 Grotius and his followers 
consider customary law as a practice accepted by some people but not as specific constitutive 
elements.6 Grotius clearly states: “customary law could never be taken as the law of nations 
properly said.”7  
In the same way, the binding nature of treaties was frequently regarded as controversial and 
intensely debated.8 For instance, Grotius thought that a treaty was only a part of the voluntary 
law of nations, which meant that treaties, as contracts made between two nations, were binding 
only for the contracting States.9 Nevertheless, at the end of 17th century, a German lawyer 
                                                          
1 C.G. Weeramantry. Universalising International Law. Leiden/Boston. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003. p. 31. 
2 Ibid., p. 45. 
3 E.g. The Treaty of Kadesh negotiated between Ancient Egyptians and the Hittites, adopted in the 1274 BC. 
4 J.B. Murphy. The Philosophy of Positive Law: Foundations of Jurisprudence. New Haven and London. Yale 
University Press 2005. p.125. 
5 D. Gaurier. An Overview of the Sources of the Sources in the Classical Works of International Law. Sources in 
the Modern Tradition. - S. Besson and J. D’Aspremont (eds). The Oxford Handbook on The Sources of 
International Law. – Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017, p. 91. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 J. Austin. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined - Being the First Part of a Series of Lectures on 
Jurisprudence, or the Philosophy of Positive Law (1832) – W. E. Rumble. (ed.). New York: Cambridge 
University Press 2009. pp. 80-90. 
9 Ibid., p. 96. 
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Samuel Rachel followed and improved the aforementioned widely accepted approach and 
confirmed that the customary law was one of the sources of international law and treaties were 
presented as another independent source of international law.10 In the 19th century, there were 
no more doubts that customary law and treaties were the interrelated and main sources of 
international law.11 However, the application of the sources of international law by courts and 
other judicial bodies was not yet very common.12 In the 20th century, the 1920 Statute of the 
PCIJ,13 and the 1969 VCLT had a significant role in the crystallization of the doctrine of sources 
in international law.14  
Currently, contemporary sources of international law are enlisted by Art. 38 (1) of the ICJ 
Statute, which is a significant point of reference in discourses on sources of international law 
and the follow-on to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.15 Article 38 of 
the Statute of the PCIJ recognized treaties and customs as primary sources of international 
law.16 Moreover, some international legal scholars, as well as judges, suggest certain treaties 
and customs referring to international humanitarian law and international criminal law to be 
considered as primary sources of these disciplines.17 
Customary law is the oldest and dominant source of international law. Article 38.1 of the ICJ 
Statute also defines it as one of the most dominant sources of international law.18 Nevertheless, 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute does not provide an answer to whether the interrelationship of 
custom and treaty in international law exists. Therefore, there are some difficulties and 
challenges regarding the interrelationship of the aforementioned sources. However, practice 
displays that their interrelationship exists and it does not occur in a vacuum. It is also connected 
with elements belonging to other sources of international law.19  
Since Art. 38.1 of ICJ Statute includes neither clear distinction nor hierarchy of formal sources 
of international law, their application and interrelationship is multidimensional in legal 
practice.20 Therefore, the author of this paper believes that by exploring the relation of the 
                                                          
10 Ibid., p. 100. 
11 D. Gaurier. Sources in the Modern Tradition. An Overview of the Sources of the Sources in the Classical 
Works of International Law. op. cit., pp. 92-98. 
12 Ibid., p. 96. 
13 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Geneva 13.12.1920, e.i.f. 16.12. 1920. Art 38. 
14 The VCLT - Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Vienna, 23.06.1969, e.i.f. 27.01.1980, Art 53. 
15 The ICJ Statute. San Francisco, 26.06.1945, e.i.f. 24.10.1945. Art. 38. 
16 C.G. Weeramantry. Universalising International Law. Leiden/Boston. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2003. op. 
cit., p. 45. 
17 B. Simma and P. Alston. The Law of Human Rights 12 Harvard Journal of International Law 1988(82), pp. 
89–90. 
18 Statute of the International Court of Justice. San Francisco, 26.06.1945, e.i.f. 24.10.1945. Art.38.1. 
19 T. Erskine. Studies in International Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1898, p. 160. 
20 R. Higgins. Process and Problems. Oxford. Oxford University Press 1995, pp. 210-211. 
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sources of international law with the general doctrine of the sources of international law, the 
vague issue of the interrelation of sources of international law will be better clarified. 
In public international law, the custom remains the powerful but subliminal source of law and 
it is the source of durability and flexibility for international law.21 Moreover, one of the oldest 
sources of international law is customary law, prescribing norms binding on all States.22 
International customary norms have two elements: state practice and opinio juris.23 Every norm 
of customary international law comprises both these elements.24 However, customary 
international law entails special difficulties for itself to be identified in relation with treaty law 
in legal systems,25 where law is created and formed by consent of communities, but any formal 
enactment by governmental entities is ignored.26  
These elements - state practice and opinio juris - require closer examination regarding the 
interrelation of the aforementioned sources. The reason behind this is the assumption that in 
order to create customary law, the aforementioned elements may no more require recognition 
by governmental entities. Instead, the belief of and actions performed by communities are 
sufficient.27 Moreover, pursuant to the ICJ’s decision in the Nicaragua case, in order to reveal 
the existence of customary rules, state actions should be consistent with a customary rule, while 
in case of inconsistency with a given norm, states should condemn such conducts and not 
recognize it as a new rule.28  
As regards opinio juris, the definition of belief in the obligation is not entirely provided. Firstly, 
it ignores the fact that many rules are obligatory. For instance, the principle of sovereignty over 
the continental shelf, for which the real opinio juris is a belief not in an obligation but in a 
right.29 Secondly, and more fundamentally, as a belief of a state, there is neither consideration 
of opinio juris as the assertion of a legal right nor the acknowledgment of a legal obligation. 
The author of the thesis supports the position that the international legal order is moving 
towards a vertical legal system and the paper will develop the idea that a no-hierarchy concept 
of sources of international law is normatively problematic. It does not cope with the challenges 
it faces in the 21st century because, for instance, it evolves the idea that instruments of 
                                                          
21 D. M. Bodansky. The Concept of Customary International Law. – 3 Michigan Journal of International Law 
1995(16), p. 668. 
22 Ibid., p. 670. 
23 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reps 1969, p. 3. 
24 SS Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), Judgment, the PCIJ reports 1927, para 127. 
25 D. M. Bodansky. The Concept of Customary International Law., op. cit., p. 670. 
26 D. J. Bederman. The Spirit of International Law. Athens: The University of Georgia Press 2002, pp. 32-33. 
27 Supra note 23, p. 678. 
28 Nicaragua v. USA, Judgment, I.C.J. Reps 1986, p. 98. 
29 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, I.C.J. op. cit., p. 105. 
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international law are crafted through essentially the horizontal process instead of the vertical 
process.30 These diverse legal approaches to the aforementioned sources make their 
interrelationship more ambiguous and problematic in the international legal system. Therefore, 
in order to reveal how the international customary law interrelates with the treaty law, various 
approaches supporting the superiority of the international customary law over the treaty law 
will be examined in the present paper. 
The problem presented in the current research is an issue of the superiority of custom over 
treaties in international law. This research problem is relevant because according to Art. 38 of 
the ICJ Statute, the distinction is only made between formal and material sources of 
international law; the Statute does not deal with the hierarchical interrelation of custom and 
treaty in international law.31 According to the current version of 38 Article of the ICJ Statute, 
international conventions, customs, and general principles are formal sources, while judicial 
decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists are recognized as material 
sources in the sense that they are not the law, but merely evidence of the law.32  
However, because a clear hierarchical distinction is not inherent in the aforementioned formal 
sources of international law, especially between custom and treaty, many international law 
scholars, lawyers, and judges consider them as equal sources, while others develop hierarchical 
approaches to them.33 On the one hand, there is an opinion that treaty law must have superiority 
over customary international law in any case. On the other hand, treaty law and international 
customary law might be equal or international customary law may be superior over treaty law 
in certain cases.34  
The purpose of the present paper is to prove the superiority of the custom over the treaty in 
international law. Accordingly, the principal objects of the present research are Article 38 of 
the PCIJ Statute, Art. 38 of the ICJ Statute and Art. 53 of the VCLT. Other objects of the 
research are jurisprudence of the international courts and tribunals as well. 
The present paper develops a hypothesis that the custom is superior over the treaty in 
international law. To uphold this hypothesis, the paper identifies the following research 
questions: (i) what determines the significance of customary law within the scope of 
                                                          
30 Ibid., p. 178. 
31 J. Grant. International Law Essentials. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2014, p. 11. 
32 The ICJ Statute. San Francisco, 26.06.1945, e.i.f. 24.10.1945. Art. 38. 
33 J. O. McGinnis. The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and Customary International Law - The 
Example of the WTO’, 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 2003(585), p. 231. 
34 A. Cassese. The Hierarchy of Rules in International Law: The Role of Jus Cogens. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2005, p. 155. 
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international law; (ii) do customs have superiority over treaties according to the legal-formalist 
theory of international law? (iii) what challenges does customary international law face in the 
course of interrelation with treaty law? (iv) how are the jus cogens’ norms applied by 
international courts, when the custom interrelates with the treaty in international law?  
To address the aforementioned research questions, the paper-primarily applies the analytical 
method of research supplemented by the comparative method. The analytical method will be 
applied to examine the interrelationship of customs and treaties in international law. By 
employing the comparative method, international courts’ and tribunals’ case law will be 
compared to each other regarding whether customary law and treaty law are applied 
hierarchically in practice. Additionally, this method will be used to compare international 
customary and treaty laws in terms of superiority.  
The research thoroughly analyzes instruments of international law as well as judgments of 
international courts and tribunals concerning the interaction of custom with a treaty in the 
international legal decision-making process. The author of the paper supposes that, by such 
exploration and comparison, arguments will be provided in favor of those specific 
circumstances in which custom and treaty interrelate.  
In the same way, some selected cases of the aforementioned international judicial bodies will 
be compared to each other by applying the comparative method in light of providing an answer 
regarding invoking jus cogens’ norms by international courts in the course of the 
interrelationship of a custom and a treaty in international law.35 Furthermore, to a certain extent, 
the author of this paper relies on peer-reviewed literature, commentaries on international 
treaties and case law of international courts and tribunals as well as studies and articles of 
international law scholars and professionals and reports of various NGOs.  
The present paper consists of three chapters. The first chapter focuses on exploring positions of 
custom and treaty in international law and it will reveal and examine how these sources 
interrelate. Furthermore, it will analyze a non-traditional approach to customary international 
law and explore Art. 38 of the ICJ Statute in light of the interrelationship of custom and treaty 
in international law.  
                                                          
35 Ibid. 
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Moreover, elements of customary international law such as state practice and opinio juris will 
be explored in light of the historical collectivist voluntarist-positivist schools and a non-
traditional approach to the customary international law.  
Besides, the first chapter will examine the two aforementioned research questions on whether 
international customary law has superiority over treaty law in international law and challenges 
of customary law in the course of its interrelation with treaty law. through research of the 
interrelationship of customary international law and other sources of law, the custom primacy 
theory will be significantly underpinned. Thus, the author of this paper makes an attempt to 
support the custom primacy theory. 
The second chapter explores the interrelationship of these sources in terms of various theories 
and traditions of international law such as the legal-formalist theory and the anti-formalist 
tradition. Moreover, in addition to the aforementioned theory and tradition, alternative 
approaches to the interrelationship of sources of international law will be explored.  
Thus, chapter two is dedicated to the analysis of the second research question concerning the 
approaches applied in regards to the interrelation of sources in the international legal system 
where the customary international law has preeminence over the treaty law. 
Also, the second chapter dwells on the research query on whether there is a hierarchy among 
the sources of international law. The attempt is made to determine the place of peremptory 
norms and Article 103 of the UN Charter within the sources of international law. After 
exploring preferences and scales of values of customary law and treaty law, the author supposes 
that it is possible to determine one standard approach to the interrelation of sources. 
The third chapter explores challenges in the application of the concept of jus cogens in respect 
to the interrelationship of these sources of international law. Problems related to the 
identification of the norms of jus cogens, determination of their values and their application, 
when the sources of international law are interrelated, are quite complicated.36 By examining 
the foregoing challenging issues the author of the present paper resolves the fourth research 
query regarding the application of norms of jus cogens by international courts and tribunals in 
those circumstances when the customary international law interrelates with the treaty law.  
                                                          
36 S. Kadelbach, H. Maarten and W. Harmen. Jus Cogens: Genesis, Function and Identification of Jus Cogens 
Norms. The Hague. Asser Press 2015, p. 157. 
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For the aforementioned purposes, the application of the norms of jus cogens by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in its decisions, which are also based on international treaties, 
will be critically studied in respect to the interrelationship of sources in international law.37  
Analysis of the judgments of the IACHR may provide a clear answer regarding the interrelation 
of the customary international law with treaty law. Moreover, the judgments of international 
courts and tribunals in relation to the application of custom and treaty will be examined. 
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37 K. Hossain. The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation under the U.N. Charter. – 3 Santa Clara Journal of 
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1. POSITION OF A CUSTOM AND A TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The interplay between treaty and custom is a topic of great importance in practice and theory 
of international law. Determination of a place of custom and treaty in international law does not 
occur in vacuum; there are some dilemmas regarding it. Neither hierarchical separation nor 
differentiation between custom and treaty in international law is exhaustively provided by 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.38 The ICJ Statute is the only text in which the member states of 
the UN have recognized the need for authoritative international instruments in order to generate 
contemporary international law.  
The ICJ judgments and advisory opinions have predominance in determination of custom and 
treaty in international law. For example, one of the conspicuous judgement is on Canada v. the 
USA case, in which the ICJ’s predominance regarding determination of a place of custom and 
treaty in international law is highlighted.39 Notwithstanding this, certain controversial questions 
have emerged regarding whether there is equality between custom and treaty in international 
law or whether there is hierarchical differentiation between them.40 
Theoretically, based on the general doctrine of sources of international law, all formal sources 
of international law are equal and no single formal source can take precedence over another.41 
However, common sense and practical matters reveal that, firstly, it is recommended to pay 
attention to any relevant applicable customary rules, then – appropriate conventional norms and 
in case of failure, general principles of law might be applied.42  
Nonetheless, based on Art. 38.2 of the ICJ Statute, the ICJ applies principles of equity, fairness 
and justice as it did in Canada v. the USA case.43 Though, in the Gulf of Maine case, where a 
boundary had to be set between Canada and the USA, equity was invoked as a general principle 
of law under Art. 38 (1) (c).44 Art. 38.1 of the ICJ Statute establishes a flexible and workable 
approach of applying sources of international law and granted discretion to the International 
Court of Justice to the extent where a particular case gives an opportunity to do so.45  
                                                          
38 Statute of the International Court of Justice. San Francisco, 26 June 1945. Art.38.1. 
39 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Judgement, I.C.J. Oral Proceedings Vol.VI 
1984, pp 156-157. 
40 S. McCaffrey, D. Shelton, J. Cerone. Public International Law: Cases Problems and Texts. New York. Lexis 
Nexis 2010, p. 160.  
41 Ibid., p. 166. 
42 J. Grant, Essentials of International Law. Edinburgh. Edinburgh University Press 2014, p.60. 
43 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area. op., cit. pp. 296-305. 
44 Ibid., p. 306 
45 Supra note 42, pp. 70-71. 
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Art. 38.1 of the ICJ Statute identifies custom as an evidence of  general practice and 
characterizes it as the oldest and dominant source of international law, while international 
treaties play the same role in international law as contracts do in national law.46 Moreover, Hans 
Kelsen said that pacta sunt servanda was a norm of customary international law and it obligated 
the states to behave in conformity with the treaties they had concluded.47  
Furthermore, James Richard Crawford took the same view and argued that international law 
was a customary law system despite all the treaties - even the principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
which was a customary law obligation.48 The custom-primacy theory posits that customary law 
must be seen as normatively superior over treaty law due to its ability to generate universally 
applicable norms.49 For instance, the ICJ unambiguously stated that customary norms must be 
universally applicable to all members of the international community and cannot be subject to 
any right of unilateral exclusion.50 Therefore, in the author’s opinion international customary 
law is hierarchically dominant over other sources of international law. 
The role of treaty in international law is one of the most controversial issues as well. For 
instance, Hersch Lauterpacht thought that treaties could be considered as number one in the 
hierarchy of the sources of international law.51 Iain Scobbie, Senior lecturer in international law 
in University of Glasgow, also shared Lauterpacht’s opinion and supposed that international 
conventions and treaties must be the most superior among sources of international law.52 The 
potential argument why Iain Scobbie deemed so is that international treaties are applicable to 
the state concerned and they require a two-stage process of approval such as signing and 
ratification, which increases their advantage over other sources such as customary law. 
The author of this paper disagrees with the aforementioned opinions regarding the advantage 
of treaty law because a custom might be restated in a treaty format and in this case, if treaty law 
is at the forefront, then it is a matter of customary law. For example, the UN Charter includes 
some fundamental customary rules, which are restated in the Charter.53 Moreover, pursuant to 
                                                          
46 Supra note 40, p. 189. 
47 H. Kelsen. General Theory of law and State. Cambridge. Harvard University Press 1945, p. 121. 
48 J.R. Crawford. Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law. The Hague. Brill | Nijhoff 2014, p. 
57. 
49 T. Stein. The Persistent Objector and International Law. - 26 American Journal of International Law Law 
1985(2), pp 457-482. 
50 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v. Netherlands), Summaries of Judgments, Advisory Opinions 
and Orders, I.C.J. 1969, pp. 2-3. 
51 H. Lauterpacht. The Function of the Law in the International Community New Jersey: The Lawbook 
Exchange LTD 2000, pp. 34-40. 
52 I. G.M. Scobbie. The Theorist as Judge: Hersch Lauterpacht's Concept of the International Judicial Function. - 
2E-Journal of International Law (1997), pp. 264-298. 
53 D. J. Harris. Cases and Materials on International Law, Fifth Edition. London: London Sweet & Maxwell 
1998, p. 60. 
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Art. 103 of the UN Charter when there is a collision of norms regarding obligations of the UN 
member states, their foremost obligations shall prevail and will be fulfilled under the present 
Charter.54 The aforementioned provision can be interpreted in a way that Art. 103 of the UN 
Charter refers to those obligations of the states, which derive only from treaty law. One of the 
arguments of that statement is that Article 103 refers only to member States’ such international 
agreements and obligations, which derives from other international treaties law than the UN 
Charter.  
Besides, Article 103 of the UN Charter does not mention customary law in that provision at all 
when it refers to the hierarchic application of the UN Charter regarding the aforementioned 
collision of norms. At the same time mentioning of customary rules in Article 103 of the UN 
Charter is not expressed by any interpretation method of norms. Therefore, it can be argued that 
customary international law holds the first place in the hierarchy of the sources of international 
law. 
 
1.1. Historical, Collectivist, Voluntarist-Positivist Schools and Non-Traditional 
Approach to interrelationship of a custom and a treaty in international law 
In order for a customary norm to be formed, its principal elements such as state practice and 
opinio juris must meet certain requirements. The first element – state practice - includes 
generality, duration and consistency.55 Though, the dilemma is that general practice of states 
has never been sufficiently established.56 The issue of consistency is directly addressed in the 
Military and Paramilitary Activities Case, where the ICJ held that a state practice should be 
consistent and when states behave inconsistently under the given rule, this should be treated as 
breaking the rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.57 The second element - 
opinio juris  is a psychological element considered as a belief of states58 that converts practice 
into customs.59  
 
                                                          
54 The UN Charter, San Francisco, 26.06.1945, e.i.f. 24.10.1945. Art. 103. 
55 V. O. Gluck. Introduction to Rule of Law Practice. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press 
2010. p. 305. 
56 O. Yasuaki. International Law in a Trans-Civilizational World. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press 2017, 
pp. 149-171. 
57 The USA v. Nicaragua. Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 100. 
58 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reps 1969, p. 18. 
59 Ibid., p. 20.  
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The author of this paper believes that the customary international law was profoundly 
challenged, when a non-traditional view emerged, which weakens the superiority of custom 
over treaty in international law. The non-traditional scholars advocate that the two elements - 
state practice and opinio juris - should not be considered as compulsory elements for forming 
a customary rule.60 The non-traditional view tried to give rise to a legal theory which would 
announce these two elements as non-compulsory requirements for forming international 
customary norms.61  
The application of the non-traditional approach to forming the norms of customary international 
law can be encountered in the ICJ’s judgment of the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.62 An 
international lawyer Michael Akehurst supposed, the aforementioned judgement enhanced 
thoughts that international treaty law may change its treaty character into customary character 
because the ICJ relied on the non-traditional view concerning the formation of customary 
international law in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. 63  
The non-traditional approach to customary international law undermines the superiority of 
custom over treaty in international law because this approach decreases importance of one of 
the elements of customary law such as state practice, which is recognized as a mandatory 
element for forming a customary norm. In the essence, the non-traditional theory postulates that 
state practice is merely a regularity of a fact but not a constituting element of a customary norm. 
One of the examples of this postulation is that the non-traditional approach came up with the 
idea that the reinterpretation of customary international law is necessary by removing state 
practice and opinio juris from the practice-based methodological orientation.64 Moreover, 
according to the non-traditional theory, resolutions or various international conventions adopted 
by international bodies may be considered as starting points, which further develop customs in 
international law.65 The positive development of the non-traditional theory is that it expands 
norms of human rights to the international crimes and promotes the idea that convicts can no 
longer escape the international justice.66 The proposal by the non-traditionalist scholars has a 
                                                          
60 M. Akehurst. A Modern Introduction to International Law. – P. Malanczuk (ed.). Akehurst’s Modern 
Introduction to International Law. New York: Routledge 1997, p. 44. 
61 Ibid., p. 70. 
62 D. J. Harris. Cases and Materials on International Law, Fifth Edition. London: London Sweet & Maxwell 
1998., p. 75. 
63 M. Akehurst. A Modern Introduction to International Law. op. cit., p. 80. 
64 G.J.H. Van Hoof. Rethinking the Sources of International Law. Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers 1983, pp. 107–108. 
65 B. Simma., op.cit., pp. 89–90. 
66 G.J.H. Van Hoof. op, cit., p. 105. 
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potentially high value because long-held legal customary norms may be under the risk of 
extinction.67  
In addition, according to the non-traditional approach, the element of state practice has a limited 
explanation in the international legal theory.68 The narrow understanding of state practice 
means it limits comprehension and describes the state practice as actions performed by the states 
in the course of their international relations. All these actions and omissions are neutral, which 
means that they are no indication that the state wishes any behavior to be prescribed as a norm.69 
In the essence, it means that state practice is merely a regularity of a fact, not a norm.70 
Therefore, the author of this paper considers that the non-traditional theory argues the opposite 
to the superiority of custom over treaty in international law. 
The second element of customary law – opinio juris is significant for discussion in light of 
interrelationship of custom and treaty in international law. The concept of opinio juris is 
arguably the most disputed and the least comprehended component of customary international 
law.71 There are three approaches to regarding the role of opinio juris in the interrelationship of 
a custom and a treaty in international law.72 The author of this paper considers that the idea of 
opinio juris is mysterious and it can be said that the opinio juris theory is not clearly defined 
because the states’ belief is unclear and it does not explain how a widespread and uniform 
practice actually becomes legally binding.73  
According to the historical school, opinio juris is the primary and fundamental component of 
the customary law and the state practice is the product of opinio juris.74 In a nutshell, state 
practice and opinio juris are not independent from one another and they are closely connected 
as cause and effect.75 It may be noted that the phrasing of Article 38 of the Statute of the World 
Court seems to imply this viewpoint because it describes international custom as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as a law.76 This could be interpreted in a way that custom is not 
binding because it constitutes a reflection of the fundamental fact of acceptance of the practice 
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as law.77 Since the historical school posits that custom is not binding and it is merely a reflection 
of a practice accepted as law, custom can interrelate with treaty in a way that treaty might be 
superior over custom in international legal practice.  
Contrary to the historical school, the voluntarist-positivist school holds that opinio juris and 
practice are independent from each other and both must be present before a rule of customary 
international law can be held to exist.78 Therefore, customary law is seen as a kind of alliance 
between state practice and opinio juris.79 It may be said that the voluntarist school of thought 
might be strongly individualistic in the sense that each state decides whether to accept an 
obligation as customary law or whether or not to accede to a treaty.80 The importance of the 
voluntarist school’s emphasis on the strict separation of state practice and opinio juris cannot 
be overestimated.81  
However, the principal point is that this school of thought insists on the actual presence of 
opinio juris before there can be a rule of customary law.82 Moreover, the presence of that utterly 
indispensable component cannot be inferred from the evidence of state practice alone.83 A final 
observation is that opinio juris has a strong psychological flavor.84 It is about what is in the 
mind of a given state concerning a given practice.85 It might be objected that states do not have 
minds in the way that humans do.86 One of the features of Nineteenth-Century positivist writing 
was a firm belief in the real personality of states – and that could easily be extended to include 
a collective will or mind.87  
Although, according to voluntarist positivist school, state practice and opinio juris exist 
independently and their actual presence is mandatory before customary norm is formed. It might 
be supposed that voluntarist-positivist school supports the superiority of custom over other 
sources of international law. Furthermore, according to the voluntarist-positivist school the 
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states independently decide whether to accept various obligations, deriving from customary 
law, based on widely accepted state practice and opinio juris, to accede to a new treaty. Based 
on this, it can be said that the idea of superiority of customary law among sources of 
international law is strengthened under the voluntarist-positivist school. 
The collectivist school constitutes the third viewpoint regarding opinio juris, which 
significantly contradicts with both previous ones.88 It rejects the positivist emphasis on the 
fundamental rights of individual states and the need for individual consent of each state to a 
rule of law.89 It adopts a more collectivist or communitarian view of international law in 
general.90 It is the emphasis on the interdependence of states, instead of independence, as the 
fundamental feature of international society.91 The opinio juris element of customary law refers 
to the acceptance of a practice as law by the international community at large, rather than to the 
acceptance by each state individually.92  
One of the advantages of the collectivist school’s position is that it is able to posit a 
commendably objective means for determining the existence of the global general will.93 The 
most important point is that the third school tends to regard opinio juris as forming in the wake 
of state practice and its consequence.94 The third approach tends to hold that opinio juris can 
be presumed to be present on the basis of state practice.95 Presumably, the position is that, if 
the practice is sufficiently widespread (and it definitely does not need to be universal) then the 
existence of opinio juris can be inferred.96 
Based on the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ spoke in psychological terms regarding 
opinio juris. Namely, the ICJ held that states must be conscious of having a duty in order for a 
rule of customary law to be present.97 Moreover, in this case the ICJ referred to opinio juris as 
a subjective element of customary law.98 More specifically, the same view is expressed in the 
case of Nicaragua v. the United States of America and it is described as a belief, which appears 
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to have a psychological flavor.99 Further in this apparently psychological vein, the Court held 
that States have to know themselves the weight of a legal obligation toward them .100  
In contrast, the Court does not expressly say whether this subjective element or belief refers to 
the positions of each state individually or to the subjective stance of the community as a whole. 
In later cases, the Court has held back from this overtly psychological phraseology.101 The 
World Court has not yet provided a final unequivocal opinion as to which view of customary 
law is correct and, consequently, which view of opinio juris must be adopted.  
However, the author of this paper supports the approach proposed by the collectivist school 
because, this approach best meets the indirect request of contemporary international community 
with regard to creating the customary international rule. Moreover, it should be noted that the 
Statute of the ICJ describes custom as a source of law deriving from the general practice of 
States,102 i.e. the component of general practice can be interpreted in such a way which does 
not specifically refer to state practice but additionally includes religious, ethnic, cultural or other 
practices commonly accepted as law, implying that any of the following could be the one to 
accept the respective practice as customary law. 
 
1.2 The Superiority of a custom over a treaty in international law 
The previous section of the paper explored how a custom and a treaty are interrelated in 
international law under various schools and approaches. The author of this paper made an 
attempt to demonstrate that various schools perceive the interrelation of a custom and a treaty 
in international law differently. In this part of the paper the author will follow the mainstream 
of the voluntarist-positivist school discussed above and try to prove that custom interrelates 
with treaty in a hierarchical way. The approaches of the above mentioned schools and regarding 
the ways in which custom and treaty have an effect on each other is a topic of great practical 
and theoretical importance. Both of these sources of international law have descriptive and 
regulative values in an international legal system.103  
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These approaches across various features of customary law and treaty law suggest a new way 
of assessing the importance of the aforementioned sources of international law.104 It is generally 
accepted that customary law is a fundamental part of international law. For instance, customs, 
along with treaties, are one of the main sources of international law, according to Art. 38.1 of 
the ICJ Statute.105 Moreover, the role of custom is supreme and significant in determining the 
character and effect of the Martens Clause adopted in both the 1899106 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions.107  
Besides, the Martens Clause, being the part of the preambles to the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions, is a specific instance based on which the different sources of international law 
such as customary international law and treaty law have common and interrelated concerns 
about humanity, dignity, necessity and welfare. These elements are specifically addressed by 
the Martens Clause.108 Moreover, as a result of interrelationship of a custom and a treaty, such 
different disciplines of the international law as the humanitarian law and the human rights law 
begin to intersect.109 Furthermore, it should be noted that the principle of humanity is at the 
very heart of the legal system. This principle is not only a moral duty, but also a basic obligation 
under the international customary law and the treaty law.110  
Interrelationship of a custom and a treaty in international law may be attested by the fact that 
customary law frequently mirrors what is contained in treaties. For instance, in the Corfu 
Channel case of 1949, the ICJ held that it was Albania’s obligation to notify others of the 
presence of mines because this obligation derived not from the Hague Convention of 1907, but 
from certain general and well-recognized principles such as the principle of humanity, which is 
the principle of customary law.111  
Consequently, the author of the paper is of the view that this decision reflects the position of 
the ICJ that the principle of humanity derives not only from the Martens Clause, but also from 
the customary law. Before the 1899 Convention was drafted it was generally recognized the 
treaty law and customary law converge substantially and that customary law was more 
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advanced in certain respects.112 Dinah Shelton states: “It should be noted that both Hague 
Conventions declared or stated principles and rules that, in essence, represented then existing 
customary international law.”113 Such interactions suggest that the relationship between 
customary international law and treaty law is mutually constitutive.114  
To some extent, treaties are reflective of what customary law is. The principle of states’ 
responsibility to uphold human rights is a lucid example of that reflection because it exists in 
the customary law and a whole host of treaties as well, which prohibit violations against 
individuals and groups. The historical sources of customary international law indicate that 
European States, between 1884 and 1915, already had duties to protect colonized peoples under 
rules of natural law, as well as under treaties such as the Berlin West Africa Convention, the 
Anti-Slavery Convention and The Hague Conventions.115  
In addition, the Martens Clause concerns war crimes and crimes against humanity as well, 
where custom and treaty interrelate with each other. Antonio Cassese, international lawyer, 
argued that the Martens Clause admitted that there were laws, principles or rules of customary 
international law in a specific treaty, which resulted not only from state practice, but also from 
law of humanity and dictates of public conscience.116 It can be stated that the Martens Clause 
was specific acceptance by States in the form of a treaty that these rules existed outside of the 
treaty law i.e. in the customary law.  
Furthermore, under the Martens Clause, humanity is protected from any type of misconduct by 
not only treaty law, but customary law.117 Professor Bassiouni also notes that articles of 
Nuremburg Charter concerning the crimes against humanity come from the preambles to the 
1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions - the Martens Clause. Consequently, under the professor 
Bassiouni’s argument, it is possible to legitimately argue that in the context of customary law 
sources of these crimes existed earlier than the conventions.118 Based on the discussion above, 
there is a clear link between custom and treaty in international law.  
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Customary international law hierarchically interrelates with treaty law in international law 
concerning genocide as well. The author of this paper thinks that even before adopting the 1948 
Genocide Convention, customary law had already prohibited unlawful acts which caused 
genocidal violence. For instance, prohibition of attacking non-combatants and prohibition of 
massacre have been rules of customary law since ancient times. Therefore, the author of the 
paper supposes that international dispute settlement bodies will apply relevant customary rules 
in any case, whether or not a party to the dispute attempts to ignore the 1948 Genocide 
Convention. 
A contrary proposition, as some authors presume, might be that genocidal violence did not exist 
until the adoption of the Genocide Convention by the United Nations in 1948. However, 
Genocide is not a new phenomenon. It had originated much earlier than 1948. Ben Kiernan, 
professor of international and area studies, published a book – “Blood and Soil” in which he 
discussed numerous cases of genocidal violence committed in ancient times and colonial era 
both in North and Latin America as well as in Africa. He also published an article about the 
Third Punic War (149-146 BC), in which he argued that the Third Punic War might be 
considered as the first genocidal crime, which was committed by the Republic of Rome.119 
Customary law does not provide a legal definition of genocide, though prohibition of attacks 
against non-combatants has been a rule of customary law since ancient times.120 Therefore, the 
author of the paper tries to highlight that rules of customary law, which has always prohibited 
genocidal violence since ancient times, were codified in  the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 
Statute of the two international criminal tribunals (ICTR, ICTY), as well as in the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.121 Thus, under the auspices of those international treaties 
genocidal violence, prohibition of which derives from customary law, became an international 
crime. 
In addition, genocide, recognized as an unlawful act and genocidal violence coming from 
ancient times, can be explained under the preamble to the Genocide Convention because the 
preamble states that “during all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on 
humanity…”122 Thus, it can be stated that in 1948, the UN General Assembly recognized 
genocide as a crime, which had been an unlawful act under the customary international law for 
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a long time.123 The ICJ held that genocide is an unlawful act beyond the Convention, and noted 
that the principles prescribed in the genocide convention are binding on States without any 
reservations requested by States in the course of its signature and ratification.124 Therefore, the 
author of the paper thinks that the interrelationship of these two sources protects individuals 
and groups of people from genocide as well.  
Furthermore, the customary international law and the treaty law prior to the World War II 
provided numerous situations, which indicated widespread international practice on a range of 
fronts before the World War II and provided human rights protection. The above discussion 
regarding genocide, which is an unlawful act under the customary law, reveals that custom 
arises from continued practice by states and, interrelating with custom, treaties are one of the 
most typical and significant acts of a state in relation to other states.125  
In like manner, the judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases is one of the most 
important decisions of the ICJ’s jurisprudence in terms of the interrelationship of international 
customary and treaty laws.126 In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ identified three 
ways in which treaties and custom interrelate.127  
Firstly, treaties can be declaratory of a pre-existing rule of customary international law.128 That 
is the case of many rules contained in treaties such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, The VCLT and the Montego Bay Convention on the law of Sea.129 Secondly, treaties 
can crystallize developing customary rules – Lex Farenda in Lex Lata.130 That is usually the 
case related to conventions, which results from the work of the International Law Commission 
because one of its precise objectives is codification of developing customary rules.131 The third 
way is when custom arises from practice of those states, which are not parties to a treaty, after 
its adoption.132 This way was presented by Denmark and the Netherlands in the North Sea 
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Continental Shelf cases and was rejected with respect to the delimitation article, but accepted 
in relation to other articles of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.133  
In addition, in order for a treaty rule to be considered as a customary rule, it must have a norm-
creating character, which means that it cannot allow derogations or be subject to reservations.134 
The main controversy of the case was whether the customary rule, the equidistance principle, 
which was codified into the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, was binding on 
Germany, which was not a party to the abovementioned convention.135 The Court decided that 
it was not the case of Article 6 of the abovementioned convention and the use of equidistance 
method of delimitation was not obligatory between parties.136 Therefore, Germany was not held 
responsible under Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the continental shelf. 
From the ICJ North Sea Continental Shelf cases it can be concluded that the ICJ made the 
interrelationship of custom and treaty more clear and provided following three circumstances: 
1) the treaty interrelates with customary law if the treaty is a codification of a custom; 2) 
Customary law interrelates with a treaty when the treaty has crystallized emergent rules of 
customary law; 3) the treaty forms foundation for the passage of its provisions into customary 
law through the normal process of general practice.137  
Therefore, in this context, treaties become sources of material or evidence in support of a 
potential rule of customary law and their role is to provide material to enable the court or the 
government to find a customary rule.138 Secondly, according to the Nicaragua case decided by 
the ICJ, a custom and a treaty can coexist simultaneously.139 Thirdly, some bilateral treaties are 
able to produce a customary rule and it is the process that has to be in consistence with the terms 
of Article 38(1)(b).140  
Consequently, the author of this paper thinks that doctrines on relationships between treaty and 
custom are in further development to fill the gaps that deny full efficacy to international law as 
a system. Moreover, International law is evolving with an everlasting entanglement of its two 
main sources, while bestowing equal authority upon rules derived from these two sources.141 
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Furthermore, it is believed that customary law as a formal source of international law has an 
enduring role that cannot be diminished.142 It has flexibility and responsiveness to the fast-
changing globalizing world, no matter how big efforts are made to create treaties as well.143 
Traditionally, international law is made by and for sovereign states. The cornerstone of 
international law is the consent of States. This consent is reached by the process of 
communication that is quite complex, but leads to typical outcomes. A treaty is one such 
outcome where consent is given explicitly to a rule of international law.144 Another outcome, 
where such consent is more implicit, is customary international law.145 Treaty law and 
customary law are considered as the most important sources of international law. However, the 
current System of international law sources, controlled by the States and their governments 
through the underlying principle of consent, is inadequate to deal with the challenges of the 
modern world.146  
Customary law is much more common in international law than in most domestic legal systems. 
It is sufficient to note that this system works effectively in practice because its stability and 
predictability are in the interests of most States.147 However, there are also practical 
disadvantages. For instance, customary international law can be difficult to prove 
conclusively.148 This may require a lot of research, studying practices of as many States as 
possible and finding relevant statements expressing a legal conviction, where this is available. 
It would be quite incorrect to assume that treaty law and customary law exist in isolation and 
certain areas of international law are regulated only by treaties whilst other areas only by 
customary international law.  
On the contrary, these sources interact closely and influence each other. Stated 
differently, international law is not a static system of rules but rather a dynamic decision-
making process. Even a treaty, which is an apparently clear set of written rules, is part of this 
process.149 It is usually the product of a long evolution that involves customary international 
law, prior treaties and often deliberations of and decisions made by international organizations. 
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After its conclusion, the treaty is implemented and interpreted by international and domestic 
courts. It becomes part of state practice, sometimes leading to new customary international law, 
and may ultimately be amended or abrogated by another treaty.150 
The aforementioned complex interaction of the sources of international law entails very 
practical consequences. When a specific legal question is being examined or a particular case 
is being decided, it does not suffice to find the 'right' rule by identifying the applicable treaty or 
the appropriate rule of customary international law. Rather, it is imperative to take a synoptic 
look at various sources and analyze their relative relevance and authority.  
These rather theoretical observations can be illustrated by providing a broad overview of 
international investment law. Traditionally, investment law has derived mostly from customary 
international law. Some of this customary international law still exists today. It consists of 
certain procedural guarantees for foreign investors, like fair treatment and protection of investors 
by the home states, vis-á-vis the host states. Two particularly important features have been the 
protection of property against expropriation, and compliance with contracts concluded between 
investors and host states. In the course of the 20th Century, this seemingly stable picture of 
international investment law was disturbed by several events.  
The first was the rise of socialist ideologies, notably in the Soviet Union with its repudiation of 
private business and property rights. The second was the development of new doctrines in Latin 
America that aimed to shed economic domination by the European powers and later by the United 
States. Such Latin American ideas culminated in the Calvo Doctrine, named after the 19th 
Century Argentinian diplomat and jurist Carlos Calvo.151 This doctrine essentially rejects any 
special guarantees for foreign investors and purports to treat them just like nationals, for better or 
for worse.152 The third and probably the most consequential event was decolonization.  
Many new independent developing countries argued, with some conviction, that the property 
rights and contractual guarantees obtained by foreign investors in their countries originated in 
situations of inequality, that they constituted the perpetuation of former exploitation, and that 
investors had made and were still making excessive profits at the expense of the host countries 
and their populations.153 The investments that stirred controversy often concerned the 
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exploitation of raw materials in countries with a large or exclusive dependence on these raw 
materials for their export earnings. 
The ensuing disputes were discussed in scholarly publications, by international organizations 
and before arbitral tribunals.154 These disputes involved not only references to customary 
international law, but also the invocation of various international treaties. The investors relied 
on their acquired rights and the sanctity of contracts.155 The host countries relied on unjust 
enrichment and on the unequal nature of the agreements concerned. In addition, a new doctrine 
was developed under the label of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.156 This doctrine 
found expression in several resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations and 
essentially proclaimed that States had the permanent and inalienable right to control the natural 
resources in their territory, regardless of any contractual or property rights that foreign investors 
might have acquired.157  
It was argued that the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was superior to 
the principle of sanctity of contracts and to property rights.158 This conflict reached its 
culmination in the series of resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly in the 1970s. The 
most important one was the so-called Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted 
in December 1974.159 It was approved by an overwhelming majority that was controlled by 
developing and socialist countries, against the negative votes or abstentions of western 
industrialized states.160 Not everything in that resolution was controversial. Principles such as 
sovereign equality, peaceful settlement of disputes and promotion of international social justice 
were acceptable to all.161 
Contrary to this, there was one point on which differences were irreconcilable. It was the 
provision on expropriation. The right of states to expropriate was not contested in principle. 
It was a new clause in the resolution which led to much dispute. This clause stated  that in case 
of a dispute over compensation for expropriation, the decision should be made by the courts 
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of the expropriating State and on the basis of the law of the expropriating State.162 In other 
words, an attempt was made to de-internationalize the issue and make it an internal matter of 
the State that took the  action. This turned out to be rather unacceptable to the capital-exporting 
States and to the investors themselves. Capital-exporting States and investors insisted that any 
expropriation had to be compensated and this compensation had to be adequate, meaning that 
it had to represent the full value of the expropriated property. Moreover, it had to be prompt, 
i.e. without undue delay, and it had to be effective, that is, in a convertible currency.163 
Interestingly, the most important legal instrument to restore investors’ confidence turned out to 
be the traditional bilateral treaty. The bilateral investment treaty (BIT) became the favored way 
for many countries to guarantee legal protection to investors.164 The BITs regulate access for 
investors and guarantee fair and equitable treatment.165 These treaties grant protection in case 
of expropriation, typically by providing full, prompt and effective compensation. Perhaps most 
importantly, in case of disputes between investors and host states, the BITs offer procedural 
guarantees, typically through provisions for international arbitration.  
The already familiar picture emerges while reviewing the decisions of arbitral tribunals under 
this system.166 Tribunals apply all sources of international law in combination. They rely on 
multilateral and bilateral treaties, typically BITs. They apply customary international law and 
various international treaties. Thus, the interaction and interrelationship of various sources of 
international law can be observed in an investment dispute.  
Conclusively, the treaties and customary law are closely interrelated. They often interact by 
supplementing and replacing each other. Thus, these typical sources of international law ought 
not to be ever viewed in isolation. 
 
1.3 Custom Primacy Theory versus Treaty Primacy Theory 
In one of the previous paragraphs it was shown how custom hierarchically interrelates to treaty 
in international law under the historical, voluntarist-positivist and collectivist schools. In this 
part the author of the paper discusses challenges that customary international law may face 
when it hierarchically interrelates to treaty law because custom primacy and treaty primacy 
theories treat the interrelationship of a custom and a treaty in international law differently and 
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this creates challenges in application of both sources. The prevailing view is that customary law 
is the most prominent, principal and primary source of international law.167  
There are two principal streams of argument in the treaty primacy theory. The first type of 
argument stipulates that normatively treaties and customs interrelate equivalently. However, 
treaty prevails over custom in international law because of the matter of procedural order.168 
The first line is supported by two principal arguments. The first one is that treaties are generally 
thought to be superior instruments for resolving disputes because of their written character.169 
The second one states that, unlike customary law, treaty law is devoid of ontological and 
methodological uncertainties and international courts and tribunals give preference to treaty 
law.170 For instance, treaty norms are easier to locate, ascertain and apply than customary 
ones.171 Moreover, treaties can be applied to codify pre-existing customary norms into treaty 
law.172  
In addition, treaties can be applied to regulate bilateral and multilateral relations for governing 
holistic issues such as humanitarian or climate change problems.173 Treaties are recognized as 
lex specialis inter partes as well.174 For instance, regarding creation of the International Prize 
Court the Hague Convention (XII) explicitly provides that in case a legal query is covered by a 
treaty between the parties, the Court relies upon the provisions in the said treaty and in the 
absence of such provisions, the Court shall apply the rules of customary international law or 
general principles of law.175  
Consequently, according to the treaty primacy theory, treaty is generally viewed as a superior 
source of international law over custom due to its perceived legitimacy as a law-making 
process.  
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What can be added to the treaty primacy theory is that there is a second trend, which posits that 
treaty law is not only operationally, but also normatively superior to other law-making 
processes because treaty law includes the first-class norms of international law, which norms 
possess unique qualities and attributes.176 Also, the treaty law possess three essential qualities 
that makes it unique. 
Besides, these are ontological determinacy, practical versatility and process legitimacy. The 
ontological determinacy refers to the fact that the nature of treaties as a source of international 
law is unambiguous and uncontroversial.177 The practical versatility refers to the use of treaties 
for a variety of purposes and in a variety of contexts from the dramatic war to duty-free 
shopping.178 The process legitimacy is based on the principle of freedom of contract.179 The 
treaty-making is a conscious and deliberative process, respectful of State consent and 
contractual autonomy.180  
Furthermore, in such important areas as climate change or trade-investment, the treaty-making 
process increasingly involves civil society through the participation of NGOs in 
intergovernmental conferences.181 Moreover, in many cases treaty ratification involves a 
domestic process of legitimization, when treaties must be approved by the Parliament and 
sometimes even by popular referendum.182 For the aforementioned reasons, treaty-making is 
often regarded as relatively more transparent and democratic than the nebulous process of 
customary law formation.183 
In contrast with the treaty primacy theory, the custom primacy theory posits that customary 
international law exists autonomously and is applied separately from international treaty law.184 
The former is superior over the latter, when these two abovementioned sources possess the 
same content or when a state has reservation in order to prevent using certain norms.185 
Moreover, the customary international law has superiority over the treaty law because it pre-
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determines the treaty law and regulates its formation.186 For instance, Hans Kelsen said that this 
was a norm of general international law, and general international law was created by custom 
i.e. customary international law, which was the first stage within the international legal order.187 
Moreover, Paul Reuter states: “Treaties are binding by virtue not of a treaty but of customary 
rules.”188 In that sense, international custom is even more important than the rest of law of 
treaties.189  
In addition, it is also posited that because treaties are unable to produce genuine rules of law, 
they cannot be considered having superiority over customs.190 They can be interpreted merely 
as the source of rights and obligations if signed and ratified by states.191 The other direction of 
the customary primacy theory posits that customary law may be seen as normatively superior 
over treaty law due to its ability to generate universally applicable norms. 
On the contrary, treaties may only theoretically achieve universal applicability and still it may 
be undermined by reservations and other flexibility mechanisms.192 Moreover, the ICJ 
unambiguously stated that the rights and obligations of the customary international law shall 
have an equal force for the UN Member States and they cannot be excluded.193  
Therefore, the author of this paper is of the view that the customary international law possesses 
superiority over the treaty law and it is fully independent because it creates a systematic 
autonomy in the sources of international law and its rules exist at the international level 
independently without an agreement between the majority international actors. 
In the same way, there are three versions of the custom primacy theory coming in various guises 
and with different effects. The first version of the theory posits that custom is superior to the 
treaty law in that it precedes and pre-determines it.194 Moreover, the customary law enjoys its 
privileged and foundational status at the heart of the international legal order and represents 
itself the source of all sources i.e. the background that determines the condition of validity of 
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all other legal norms and processes.195 The first version of the custom primacy theory is not 
much concerned with custom as a law-making process as it is with certain basic, foundational 
principles such as pacta sunt servanda that happen to be of a customary nature.196  
By contrast, the second and third versions of the custom primacy theory have more to do with 
custom as a process and its comparative merits. For instance, the second version of the theory 
posits that custom is the only process capable of producing law in the proper sense of the term, 
i.e. rules of general validity applicable to the whole legal order.197 The third version of the 
custom primacy theory is more concerned with the specific attributes, which custom is said to 
possess as a law-making process.198  
In that sense the customary law suggests the promise of majority rule and universal legality. In 
this context treaty-making becomes problematic in that it gives any State the right to object to 
the formation of any proposed rule of international law.199 Therefore, the limits of treaty-
making in addressing global public good problems have prompted a return to non-consensual 
law-making processes though some scholars simply advocated a wider use of custom to achieve 
universal norms without the specific support from every member of the global community.200 
For instance, Christopher Weeramanty has claimed that custom is vastly superior over the treaty 
as an instrument for dealing with global public good challenges.201 In his view, customary 
international law provides a source, which will need to be increasingly relied upon in the future, 
where unexpected and urgent problems of unprecedented nature will keep arising for which the 
treaty law cannot provide the solution.202  
The superiority of custom is justified on utilitarian and semi-naturalist grounds generating 
norms despite opposition by a reluctant minority.203 The author of this paper thinks that the 
arguments regarding preferences of sources are context-dependent and determined by the 
project or strategy pursued by the lawyers making them. Furthermore, arguments for the 
primacy of treaty law are generally driven by the desire for determinacy and consent-based 
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legitimacy. However, arguments about the primacy of the custom are generally driven by the 
desire for autonomy deriving from consent and universality. States may prefer the design 
features of treaties, when tackling problems with high distributional costs, for example, climate 
change.  
Nonetheless, the states express a clear preference for custom in dealing with problems that 
require norms articulated at a high level of generality or in domains, where rules benefit all 
States in equal proportion, e.g. State immunities.204 Moreover, within an identical context, for 
instance, in the context of a specific dispute, the arguments about the hierarchy of sources 
typically fluctuate between the treaty primacy and custom primacy theories, which mediate the 
tension between determinacy and generality, consensualism and non-consensualism, 
sovereignty and community.205 
 
1.4 Hierarchical interaction of a custom and a treaty 
The previous section of the paper has discussed the challenges that customary international law 
may face when it interrelates with treaty law and the author of the paper has discussed the 
advantages of the custom primacy theory in the interrelationship. In this paragraph of the paper 
the author will make an attempt to prove that a custom hierarchically interacts with treaty law 
in international legal practice as well. 
It is the fact that the sources of international law are entangled in most of the cases set before 
the ICJ or other international forums.206 For instance, in the 1986 Nicaragua case, the ICJ 
observed that the right of self-defense as contained in Article 51 of the UN Charter not only 
parallels the customary right of self-defense, but restricts the scope of application of the right 
by adding a reporting mechanism.207 Mainstream process of thought in international law does 
not attribute hierarchy to the sources listed in Article 38.1 of the ICJ Statute. Those sources 
remain the focal point for determining the rights and obligations of States by international 
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dispute resolution bodies.208 For instance, leading textbooks note that this Article does not 
contain any explicit reference to the formal hierarchy.209  
In fact, a provision, in accordance with which the ICJ had to apply the sources in the order in 
which they were listed in Article 38 of the draft version of the ICJ Statute, were rejected in the 
drafting process.210 Simultaneously, however, the order in which the sources are mentioned is 
not entirely relevant because the relationship and applications of sources in the international 
legal order are based on hierarchical features to some extent. For that reason, in international 
law two distinctive directions of the doctrine of sources exist in international law. The first of 
them supports a horizontal system while the second one enhances a vertical system of rights 
and obligations in international law.  
According to the first direction of the theory of sources, international law has been developed 
as a horizontal system of norms without hierarchy of sources of international law. The first 
direction enhances the non-hierarchy theory in the international law positing that sources of 
international law enjoy an equal status and no formal hierarchy exist.211  
Meanwhile, however, states adjudicators and legal scholars have expressed clear preferences 
for particular sources and established an informal hierarchy of law-making processes.212 
Furthermore, the international legal order has developed some hierarchical features in the 
customary law as well as in the treaty-based Charter’s obligations and rights.213  
In addition, Article 103 of the UN Charter determines that the UN Charter obligations shall 
prevail when there is a collision between the obligations under the UN Charter and obligations 
of the Member States under any other international agreement.214 The mentioned clause can be 
interpreted as a source-based hierarchy because the Charter’s obligations stem from the treaty 
and they refer to treaties not to customs. However, judicial practice reveals that Charter 
obligations do not always prevail in case of conflict of norms.215  
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The second direction of the doctrine of sources of international law highlights the superiority 
of the customary international law over the treaty law because of the existence of jus cogens 
norms in the customary international law.216 The aforementioned second direction considers 
that jus cogens rules are the products of the existing sources of international law and some of 
them derive from customary international law as well.217 There is a question about whether it 
derives from the treaty law or customary international law. The answer is that, according to the 
second direction, in the treaty law the jus cogens’ norms are only codified from the customary 
international law. 218 
Additionally, under David Kennedy’s proposal the customary international law in light of the 
jus cogens norms is hierarchically located at the highest level and it is hierarchically superior 
over other sources of the international legal order.219 Under Article 53 of the VCLT, when any 
international treaty norm is contrary to any customary peremptory norm, such a treaty or part 
of it is void.220  
The customary international law includes the principle of automatic and direct applicability 
recognized in practice of Western countries.221 All rules of customary international law are 
universally recognized. Both national and international courts automatically and directly apply 
these customary international rules.222 Therefore, customary law is the source that the ICJ still 
looks at in almost all cases before deciding a dispute.  
The fact is that almost all norms of customary international law are directly and automatically 
binding on States and are superior to similar treaty norms in almost all circumstances.223 For 
instance, in the case of Nicaragua v. USA the ICJ held that multilateral treaty reservations could 
not alter the legal position of the Court with regard to relying on the customary international 
law because even if treaty clauses and customary rules deal with the same subject matter, the 
customary rules exists independently and the non-treaty reservations do not apply to them.224  
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What is more, the ICJ declared that even if principles of the customary international law were 
subsequently codified into treaties they continue to exist side by side and whether, for some 
reason, the treaty ceases to apply between treaty parties, the identical customary clause 
continues to apply between them.225 Furthermore, the ICJ claimed that when customary 
international law and treaty law provisions are not identical, the customary international law 
continues to exist alongside the treaty law.226  
Consequently, based on the aforementioned analysis, the author of the paper thinks that the 
existence of the hierarchy among sources of international law is evident from theoretical and 
practical perspective. It may also be concluded that norms deriving purely from the treaty law, 
regarding which any reservations are made by states, come at the third place after jus cogens 
norms and norms of the customary international law because such treaty norms do not have an 
absolute applicability or binding character upon the subjects of international law.  
In addition, the author of the paper considers that the first direction of the doctrine of sources 
is imperfect because the mentioned direction supports the idea of the horizontal system of 
sources of international law, which recognizes the formal equivalence of sources.227  
However, at the same time it creates an informal hierarchy of sources in their practical 
application.228 Moreover, it stems from the fact that the subjects of international law and other 
actors express preferences for particular desirable sources, which are uphold certain values such 
as determinacy, versatility and universality.229 In addition, such an informal hierarchy is fluid 
and transient because it is possible that treaties take precedence over customs as a matter of 
procedural or operational priority.230  
However, the custom is still a primary source providing the framework, background and the 
principal instrument of the interpretation of treaties.231 Another, even more important fact is 
that arguments about the primacy of treaty law are based on determinacy and consent-based 
legitimacy, while arguments about the primacy of customary law stem from autonomy and 
universality.232  
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Moreover, the PCIJ and ICJ cases show that almost in all the disputes the PCIJ and ICJ primarily 
took into consideration whether there existed a customary rule, which regulated the 
controversial conducts of states. For that reason, the aforementioned international courts firstly 
asked the state party or parties to submit evidences, which would confirm the existence of the 
customary rule(s). For instance, the Lotus case judged by PCIJ was the earliest judicial 
pronouncement on the existence of customary norms and remains relevant till the present day. 
In the Lotus case, the PCIJ had to decide whether there was a rule in international law 
prohibiting the exercise of jurisdiction by Turkey regarding the prosecution of the French 
lieutenant. After analyzing the evidence brought by France, the court concluded that it was 
impossible to verify the existence of a customary rule affirming that jurisdiction in collision 
cases was of the flag State.233 Therefore, France could not prove the existence of the mentioned 
customary rule and it was not possible to prove the guilt allegedly committed by Turkey.  
Consequently, the Lotus case is a good example that the customary international law has 
superiority over other sources of international law in international courts’ disputes. However, 
it is crucial for a state to prove the existence of a customary norm. 
Moreover, in the Asylum case, brought before the ICJ by Colombia against Peru, the main 
dispute involved whether Peru was bound by the alleged local custom granting diplomatic 
asylum, which would force Peru to allow a safe passage for a General to Colombia.234 Like in 
the Lotus case, the ICJ asked Colombia to submit evidences which would confirm the existence 
of this customary rule. However, Colombia could not prove the existence of such a rule and 
consequently, the ICJ stated that Peru could not hold responsibility.235  
Therefore, proving the existence of the customary rule was a crucial issue by which the outcome 
of the Asylum case was determined. This case illustrated the great importance of the customary 
international law in resolving international disputes between states. Therefore, as with the Lotus 
case, after the analysis the Asylum case, the author of this paper comes to the conclusion that 
customary international law is hierarchically superior over the treaty law.  
By the same token the Nicaragua case is a good example as well regarding the superiority of 
the customary international law over the treaty law. The dispute concerns the actions of the 
USA towards Nicaragua in the context of Sandinista Revolution.236 Nicaragua claimed that the 
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USA had breached the rules of international law by using direct armed force against it.237 Article 
2.4 of the UN Charter prohibits the use of armed force.238  
Therefore, the Court could have decided whether the USA had breached Art. 2(4) of the UN 
Charter since the UN Charter is a multilateral treaty which also has a binding character toward 
the USA as a party of it. However, the Court stated that the prohibition of the use of force was 
also a rule of the customary international law, thus it could discuss the matter not under Art. 
2(4) of the UN Charter, but under the customary international law.239  
Consequently, the Court decided that the USA, by arming, supporting and aiding military and 
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted against the Republic of Nicaragua in 
breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of 
another State and not to use armed force against another State.240  
Moreover, international judicial practice quite clearly reveals the relationship of the sources of 
international law in cases of contradiction of norms. For instance, the Kadi decisions of the 
CJEU as well as the Nada and Al-Dulimi decisions of the ECtHR, illustrate that the superiority 
of the Charter obligations is only acceptable as long as the UNSC acts in accordance with what 
states perceive to be the correct interpretation of the Charter.241  
In addition, these judgments indirectly support the idea that the hierarchy of sources of 
international law exists in not only in theory but in practice as well. It also shows that states 
retain the decisive role in interpreting the limits of the scope of the Charter obligations including 
the supremacy clause in Article 103 of the ICJ Statute.242 
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2 HETEROGENOUS APPROACHES TO INTERRELATIONSHIP OF A CUSTOM 
AND A TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
2.1 Legal-Formalist Theory to an interaction of a custom and a treaty 
In the previous chapter of the paper, the place and challenges which custom has and has when 
it interrelates with a treaty in international law were researched. In this paragraph the author 
will make an attempt to find out whether a custom possesses superiority over a treaty in 
international law under the legal-formalist theory. Various approaches and traditions will be 
studied as well in order to prove that a custom has superiority over a treaty in international law. 
This chapter will address the second research question whether a custom has superiority over 
treaty according to the legal-formalist theory of international law. 
Customary international law mostly comprises universally applicable norms. Customary rules 
are binding for all states as such though, not each rule of the CIL. The legal formalist theory 
describes two circumstances under which customary law resembles treaty law in a way that 
customary norms are binding upon only a few states or they may not be binding a specific state 
as treaty norms are binding only treaty parties.243 These two potential exceptions to the 
universal applicability of customary international law constitute local or regional customary 
rules and the theory of persistent objector, which is regarded as a lever against the universal 
character of the CIL.244 Below the author of the paper considers these two exceptions in detail. 
As for the first possible exception - the theory of persistent objector - the Asylum245 and the 
Fisheries cases246 are explicit international judiciary practice referring to application of 
persistent objector theory in practice. After analyzing the ICJ discussions on these cases, the 
author of this paper has come to conclusion that customary law resembles treaty law because 
of persistent objector rules, which weaken the universal applicability of customary international 
law. Moreover, there are situations, when the treaty law and the customary law contradict each 
other. Therefore, any contradiction between treaty and customary obligations can be resolved 
by means of principles of international law such as lex specialis derogat legi generali and lex 
posterior derogat legi priori.247  
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In contrast, closer scrutiny reveals that the lex specialis and lex posterior principles are rarely 
applied by international courts and tribunals because norm contradictions stem from different 
specialized regimes or sub-regimes of international law.248 For instance, such contradictions 
arise particularly between treaty obligations relating to human rights and norms of other sub-
regimes, which are treaty-based and anchored in the customary law. Such sub-regime norms 
include obligations pertaining to extradition and non-refoulement, international peace and 
security norms, investment and environmental law obligations or obligations pertaining to 
state’s immunity.249  
Pursuant to the prevailing view, the norms of international law are disorderly deployed in the 
international legal system; the system of international law is decentralized and fragmented.250 
Therefore, based on this view, international law has developed a system of horizontal rules 
binding on states or any other subjects of international law only if they agree to be bound by 
them.251 Regarding the conflict of norms the VCLT is consistent with the priority of multilateral 
agreements over customs and when there is conflict between them, the general opinion is that 
the Vienna Convention applies treaty interpretation methods to codify customary international 
law.252  
Contrary to the VCLT approach, the ICJ Statute does not grant an explicit priority to any 
source.253 There are two legal approaches regarding the interpretation of Article 38.1 of the ICJ 
Statute. According to the first one, the aforementioned Article lays down one global list of 
sources of international law and these sources are equal to other sources listed in Article 38.1 
of the ICJ Statute.254  
Consequently, under the aforementioned first approach, it is possible to consider that a custom 
and a treaty interrelate as though the contradiction of norms did not exist and neither did the 
hierarchy among the sources of international law.255  
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Contrary to the first approach, the second one stipulates that, Article 38.1 of the ICJ Statute 
prescribes two distinct lists. The first list – subparagraphs (a) to (c) - lays down exhaustively 
the formal sources and the second list – subparagraph (d) - lays down some of the means by 
which such rules of law may be determined.256 The second formal approach to the Article 
38.1(d) is consistently adopted by the international criminal courts and tribunals in their 
judgments.257 For instance, in the case of The Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al the ICTY Trial 
Chamber stated that the Tribunal cannot rely upon the judicial decisions as a source of 
international law but they may be applied as a subsidiary means.258  
Similarly, Article 20.3 of the SCSL Statute specifies that the judges of the Appeals Chamber 
may apply other international courts’ or tribunals’ relevant decisions as subsidiary materials.259 
However, the SCSL has underscored that the judicial decisions of the ICTY and the ICTR may 
not be recognized as direct sources.260 In relation to this point of view, Article 38.1 of the ICJ 
Statute raises two distinct categories: formal sources of international law and subsidiary means. 
However, Article 38.1 (d) of the ICJ Statute points out that the judicial decisions or teachings 
of legal publicists should not be interpreted in a way that would render such sources as less 
important.261  
In addition, there are distinctions between judicial decisions of national courts and judicial 
decisions of international courts. It has been observed that some judicial decisions of national 
courts present a narrow outlook or rest on a very inadequate use of the international law 
sources.262 However, this issue is not the subject of the thesis.  
As it is mentioned above, the customary international law may not always have universal 
applicability in international law because of the existence of some local customs and the 
persistent objector theory. As for the second possible exception, it refers to local customary 
international law, which binds only a group of states.263 For instance, the practice of diplomatic 
asylum in Latin American States is a local customary rule, which was the subject of discussion 
in the ICJ Asylum Case, when the ICJ acknowledged the existence of this norm as a local 
customary rule.264  
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In addition, in the case of Right of Passage over Indian Territory the ICJ recognized the 
possibility of existence of the continued practice between Portugal and India, which formed the 
basis for mutual rights and obligations between them.265 Regarding the persistent objector 
theory, it may be claimed that the states can contract out of a customary rule in the process of 
its formation.266 At the first glance, it resembles the treaty reservations to some extent. 
However, the author of this paper thinks that it would be difficult for an individual State to opt 
out of a customary rule because it would face the pressure of the vast majority of the members 
of the international community.267  
 
2.2. Alternative approaches to the interrelationship of a custom and a treaty 
There are some alternative approaches to application of sources in international law-making 
process apart from the formalist approach, which has drawbacks, because otherwise 
international community would not apply divergent methods of application of sources in 
international law. For instance, such approaches can be mentioned as the pragmatic approach 
to the application of sources in international law, the approach of the natural law doctrine and 
the positivist approach.  
The typical approach of the natural law doctrine considers customs not as a procedure for 
creating norms but only as the evidence of pre-existing legal rule.268 The positivist approach 
states that customary law must be considered as a man-made law, i.e. positive law, which 
regulates its own creation and is binding on all states.269 As regards the pragmatic approach, it 
indicates that the international treaty-making process has not evolved within a horizontal legal 
system of international law at all.270 Despite Westphalia’s Egalitarian Principles having been 
prescribed in 1648, influential states still play the largest part in international treaty-making 
process.271  
Various international conferences, congresses and summits arranged at various times are 
effective instances to support the aforementioned position regarding the international treaty-
making process.272  For instance, in 1815 the Congress of Vienna heralded an era of great power 
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management in Europe in which those great powers made decisions for the rest of Europe and 
the other states participated formally.273 The great powers laid down the rules of international 
law and acted as self-appointed law-makers while less influential states merely accepted those 
rules and ratified the treaties.274  
In addition, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 was based on “one state – one 
vote” principle although the conferences exhibited an overwhelming inequality of influence 
among the participants.275 Furthermore, the agenda and procedure of the conferences were 
determined by the few dominant military powers and several proposals supported by large 
majorities were rejected due to the opposition of few influential states.276 At the Hague 
Conference the principle of equality was formally preserved and the great powers were able to 
either force their views or prevent the adoption of proposals unacceptable to them.277  
Similarly, in 1919 the principle of equality was only formally preserved at the Paris Peace 
Conference because decisions were made in chambers by the allied states and then less 
influential countries merely ratified the decisions.278 Moreover, at the 2009 Copenhagen 
Climate Summit a small group of great powers citied political expedience and time constraints, 
brokered a deal in secrecy in the dying hours of the conference and presented it as an 
accomplished pact to the rest of the delegates, leaving other nations with a very limited choice 
– sign/take it or refuse the agreement.279  
The adoption of the Copenhagen Agreement was famously criticized by the Venezuelan 
delegate, who stated the following: “developed nations will have to be judged by the world for 
what they are doing at the moment…we are not going to let them get away with it.”280 Thus, as 
these examples demonstrate, dominance of the great powers is regular and legalized, converting 
a political power into a rightful authority in the international treaty-making process.  
theoretically, an alternative approach exists, which encompasses application of the sources, 
deriving from the restated doctrine of sources of international law. The abovementioned 
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approach appeared in the theory of sources because international rules are regularly violated.281 
For instance, the U.S’s military intervention in Iraq and NATO interference in Kosovo occurred 
without the authorization of the Security Council required by the U.N Charter.282  
The abovementioned alternative approach to the application of sources of international law 
would prevent violation of international law and make its subjects diligently comply their 
actions with the norms of international law. Consequently, misconducts and disorders would be 
decreased. The alternative approach prescribes three main groups of sources. They include all 
norms of international law regardless of their origin, which are hierarchically arranged in the 
legal system of international law.283  
In the first category, there can be all core norms of international law originating from customary 
international law, treaty law and general principles of law.284 In the second group, there may be 
all legitimated rules including various international treaties and ordinary customary rules of 
international law.285 In the third group there might be all aspirational norms of international law 
including those rules described in treaties that have not yet been adopted as substantive norms 
in the international legal system; they possess a full status of law and might have a considerable 
political or moral force.286  
To further clarify, the first group includes the most superior and established norms of 
international law such as jus cogens norms and basic principles and standards of international 
law. It may also include some of the oldest background principles of international law such as 
pacta sunt servanda and clausula rebus sic stantibus. Furthermore, it incorporates two different 
kinds of customary norms such as process values and internalized norms.  
The process values include factors, determinacy, predictability, fair negotiating process that 
makes a particular agreed-upon rule legitimate, They in turn consist of factors that demonstrate 
states’ intent to be bound including the seriousness of negotiation and the willingness to accept 
enforcement mechanisms.287 The process values may also include the principle of consistency 
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of the agreed-upon rules as well as the principle of non-intervention and the clarity of the 
agreed-upon enforcement mechanisms.288  
As regards internalized norms, they can be considered as a group of core substantive norms that 
have been widely and deeply internalized by states and other actors and which might be 
described as a core international morality such jus cogens norms.289  
The second group consists of legitimated rules of the customary and treaty law, which cover a 
wide variety of well-known bilateral and multilateral treaties including the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, the Vienna Treaty on Consular Relations, the VCLT, the Geneva 
Conventions, and the UN Charter.290 In the second group, all customary and treaty norms 
originate from legitimacy of process and they make the international law more binding.291 Many 
treaties are backed by strong process values giving them more binding character and pacta sunt 
servanda comes into force. Thus, the Geneva Conventions and the VCLT serve as examples of 
treaties imbued with powerful pedigree and determinacy that also reflect norms, deeply 
internalized by the international community.  
In addition, it is important to note that a treaty could be listed in the second group and considered 
as a legitimated source even if it contains vague norms and uses determinate means to define 
those terms. Therefore, a treaty which, on the one hand, contains a vague requirement to protect 
the environment and, on the other hand, sets up a specific mechanism or body to define the 
scope of that requirement, would constitute a legitimated treaty. Furthermore, the second group 
would make customary law more official in practice than it is now, based on the traditional 
doctrine of sources of international law.  
Thus, it comprises a group of recognized customary rules that are backed by strong evidence of 
general practice and opinio juris. These rules have repeatedly been recognized and restated as 
the rules of customary international law. Protection of tribal indigenous communities, 
inviolability of diplomats and sovereign immunity would be examples of rules falling in this 
category.292  
As regards the third group, it includes, for example, judicial decisions of international courts, 
writings of the most highly qualified publicists, aspirational norms, resolutions adopted by the 
UN General Assembly, Security Council, international organizations and major international 
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conferences. Furthermore, it may cover the Panel and Appellate Body reports of the WTO 
dispute settlement. Additionally, the third group might refer to views-comments of the 
monitoring bodies of human rights treaties.293  
In like manner, the third group refers to and covers such norms that have not yet been 
internalized and remain largely aspirational originating from a vague treaty, which were backed 
by deficient process or such a treaty, which may be lacking in both process values and 
internalized norms.294 The alternative approach to the application of the sources of international 
law deriving from the restated doctrine of sources might have a number of positive impacts in 
practice. For instance, it would eradicate distinctions between treaties and customs because it 
would convert treaties from statements of law to evidence of law, where both treaty and custom 
serve as reflections of evidence of what international society has accepted as law.295  
By the same token, it would alleviate some of the pressure created by gaps between the doctrinal 
international law and the actual practice of States.296 Likewise, by practically adopting such an 
approach, international courts and tribunals would look for the evidence whether or not the 
international community has recognized a dispute resolution norm as a customary international 
norm in which opinio juris would become the central concern, whereas the old requirement of 
consistent state practice would be abandoned.297 Andrew Guzman considers: “If states as a 
group believes there is a legal obligation, this is sufficient to generate reputational and direct 
sanctions. The question of practice is not directly relevant to the issue.”298  
Consequently, this enables finding an instant custom without much evidence of consistent state 
practice.299 The international courts also have already started to deploy such techniques. For 
instance, in the Nicaragua v. the USA case the ICJ emphasized that for a new customary rule 
to be found, state acts must be accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitatis.300  
Additionally, other advantages of  the abovementioned alternative approach to the application 
of the sources of international law are that it encourages both those advising states and those 
acting on a state’s behalf to see their actions as part of the process of international law-
making.301 It assists in clarifying international rights for legislation. Moreover, it provides 
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improved accuracy, a better picture of the international law governing the international system 
and it suggests a deeper, more powerful understating of international law.302 Therefore, the 
aforementioned alternative approaches prove that there is a hierarchy between customary and 
treaty law. The customary law has a hierarchically superior place over the treaty law and the 
Nicaragua v. the USA is an explicit example in order to support the custom primacy theory. 
 
2.3. Anti-Formalist Traditions in the relation to the interaction of the customary law and 
the treaty law 
The discussion regarding the applicability of the sources in the anti-formalist tradition of the 
20th century expresses the informal motives for the rejection of the formal approach to the 
application of sources in the international law prescribed by the formal doctrine of legal 
sources.303 The author of the paper thinks that the Anti-Formalist Tradition is by itself a legal 
theory of sources. In the Anti-Formalist Tradition there are two schools which strengthen the 
Anti-Formalist approach to the application of sources in international law.  
One of them is the New Haven School represented by Myres S. McDougal, on the other hand, 
there is a German lawyer - Carl Schmitt, whose thoughts and proposals can be considered as 
the second school which supports the anti-formalist tradition. Schmitt was active as a writer on 
international law during the most traumatic years of European history such as the periods of 
First and Second World Wars and the following period of the Cold War in the 20th century. 
McDougal and his associates lived through during the period that witnessed a cautious revival 
of Western Legal Traditions and increasing activity of international organizations.  
For the both schools the formal approach to the application of sources of international law 
seemed insufficient and incapable of grasping the contemporary political, economic and social 
phenomena.304 For instance, because both these schools had ambitious projects and concepts 
for international law, they criticized the formal approach to the application of Article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute and deemed the formal doctrine of legal sources insufficient to regulate the current 
international liberal legal order.305 As Martti Koskenniemi puts it, “Anti-formalism is always a 
call for transformation to overrule existing law either because it does not really exist at all, or 
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if it does, because it should not.”306 The overarching goal the anti-formalist tradition presented 
was human dignity, meaning the social process in which values are widely shared and the 
private choice is emphasized as the predominant modality of power.307 This definition suggests 
that freedom of choice was one of the key concepts structuring the anti-formalist tradition 
toward applicability of sources of international law.308  
In addition, Myres S. McDougal and Carl Schmitt developed the most important features of the 
Anti-Formalist Tradition in light of applicability of the sources of international law. McDougal 
and his associates wished their understatement of law as a great creative instrument of social 
policy to be shaper and deeper. With this purpose they thought of expanding the scope of 
interest in the process of formation of the decisions from the strict policy function of application 
of the authoritative decisions to a range of policy procedures such as various community 
functions in formulating and applying authoritative prescription like intelligence, 
recommending, prescribing, invoking, applying, appraising and terminating.309  
In the application of sources of international law, McDougal and his associates searched for 
rules as shorthand expressions of community expectations. For instance, they considered that 
the belief that a certain conduct is required by opinio juris extends not only to the law, but to 
any norm of conduct.310 McDougal disagreed with the formulation and application of Article 
38 of the ICJ Statute in the way in which it was prescribed in the ICJ Statute and did not share 
the formal theory of sources of law. He said that the formulas of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute 
are misleading because the ICJ Statute presents the ambiguous and capriciously limited array 
of sources, from which international law is alleged to have derived.311  
The Anti-Formalist Tradition method proposed by McDougal is the middle of legal realism and 
secular natural law.312 McDougal and his associates harmonized the shaping and influencing of 
the course of international decisions and omissions with their own brand of neoliberal 
politics.313 While McDougal explained that informality of functions, occurring in the processes 
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that culminated in a decision, becomes the law, Carl Schmitt divided his informal decision-
making concept into three working concepts of law for any legal science. These three working 
concepts were norm, decision and concrete order.314 He shared Thomas Hobbes’s thoughts that 
decisions were the sources of everything, not only as command but also as authority and 
sovereignty when applying sources in international law.315 He stated that the concept of legal 
order contains two completely different elements: the normative element of law and the 
existential element of the concrete order.316  
In addition, Schmitt opposed formal positivism by proposing the idea that when applying 
sources in the international law, the importance of the context created by the political, social 
and economic meanings of the concrete orders or institutions is must be taken into 
consideration.317 However, as both schools stated, the codification process of Article 38 of the 
PCIJ Statute did not take into consideration the moral, economic, social and political 
principles.318  
According to the Anti-formalist Tradition, the formation and application of customary law mark 
the distinction between the critical morality of international law and the positive morality of 
state or non-state actors.319 When applying sources of international law, the Formalist Approach 
is to be identified generally with the politics of control, but the Anti-formalism applies the 
empire-centered and charter-centered approaches regarding that.320 The distinctions among 
these two approaches depend on the time of conquest, colonization and savage racism.321  
These two approaches of the Anti-formalism to the application of  sources in international law 
have not yet disappeared because the colonial Euro-American invasion and occupation of 
peoples, resources and territories have moved into new empires of the various phases of the 
Cold War, globalization and human rights imperialism.322 Each of them has developed 
conceptions of legitimacy and legality.323  
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In the empire-centered approach, the application and interrelation of sources of international 
law serve the purpose of delimitation of Europe from others and this approach primarily 
concerns justification of the secular right to empire.324 Whereas the charter-centered approach 
acknowledges the nominally shared, but actually contested ideas and political forms such as 
Christianity, republicanism, liberalism, democracy, sovereignty, rights etc.325  
 
2.4. Legal-Positivist Tradition and interrelationship of a custom and a treaty in 
international law 
In the Legal-Positivist Tradition, which is still very influential, international law is seen as the 
result of the convergence of sovereign wills.326 For that reason, international law is entirely self-
centered and treats its sources as normative commands.327 In Legal Positivism interrelationship 
of the sources of international law is based on the following principles and ideas. For instance, 
they are interrelated to each other through the states and non-state-actors, which apply sources 
of international law based on freedom and equality principles, where international law has 
authoritative and binding nature over its subjects via their consent to be bound by it.328 
Moreover, the legal positivism states that interrelationship of sources of international law 
occurs by consent-based treaty organizations.329 The Legal Positivism defends the superiority 
of a normative practice of customary law, though it supports the idea of superiority of 
multilateral treaties over customs.  
In the Legal-Positivist Tradition the interrelationship of sources of international law occurs in 
a way that the customary international law is treated as judge-made law with judicial 
pronouncements of customary legal norms.330 Moreover, when there is an interrelationship of 
these sources, the customary law is characterized as specific patterns of behavior having a 
specific normative valence, which members of a group or community employ to hold one 
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another responsible.331 Therefore, the customs interrelate to other sources of international law 
in a way that they involve the attribution of a specific social meaning to a specific pattern of 
behavior constituted by the actions of members of the community. 
What is more, around 1920, Hans Kelsen adopted the theory of the dynamic structure of law 
later called the Stufenbau theory.332 The Stufenbau theory is a metaphorical representation of 
inter-norm relationships in the legal-Positivist Tradition.333 The theory is a radical departure 
from the doctrine of the international legal sources.334 Regarding the interrelationship among 
international legal sources, one can summarize four significant statements proposed by the 
Stufenbau theory.  
First, the sources of law are part of the law and all sources of international law are linked by a 
hierarchical relationship.335 Second, the sources of international law are not separate from one 
another and rules hailing from one source can change or otherwise influence rules from another 
source.336 Third, if a norm cannot be valid as a norm and it does not exist without its validity 
being traced back to another norm, then a relationship between these two norms is 
established.337 Fourth, one higher norm or source establishes the validity of another lower norm, 
i.e. its existence as a norm.338 However, this static validity relationship among sources of 
international law is better described in a dynamic sense.  
The source empowers law creation and empowerment is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition of the existence of the lower norm.339 More clearly, a norm is valid, if and when it 
was created in a certain fashion determined by another norm, which becomes the immediate 
source of validity of the first norm.340 The legal order is not a system of coordinate legal norms 
existing alongside each other, but a hierarchical ordering of various strata of legal norms.341 
Moreover, the Stufenbau theory argues about existence of the hierarchy of sources in 
                                                          
331 Ibid., p. 333. 
332 Stufenbau is an obsolete German word meaning step-pyramid.  
333 H. Kelsen. Reine Rechtslehre 2nd ed. Vienna: Franz Deuticke publisher 1960. p. 50 
334 J. Kammerhofer. The Pure Theory’s Structural Analysis of the Law. Sources in Legal-Positivist Theories. S. 
Besson and J. D’Aspremont (eds). The Oxford Handbook on The Sources of International Law. – Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2017. pp. 349-353. 
335 Ibid., pp. 345-346. 
336 Ibid., pp. 344-345. 
337 H. Kelsen. Reine Rechtslehre 2nd ed. Op. cit. p. 196. 
338 J. Kammerhofer. The Pure Theory’s Structural Analysis of the Law. Sources in Legal-Positivist Theories. S. 
Besson and J. D’Aspremont (eds). The Oxford Handbook on The Sources of International Law. – Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2017. p. 346. 
339 H. Kelsen. Allgemeine Theorie der Normen. Vienna: Manz Publishers 1979. p. 82. 
340 H. Kelsen. Reine Rechtslehre 2nd ed. Op. cit. p. 228. 
341 K. Hossain. The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation under the U.N. Charter. – 3 Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law 2005(1), p. 347. 
50 
 
international law under such conditions, which are imposed by the empowerment norm.342 
Thus, the sources are ordered and structured, according to the Stufenbau theory, although in 
international law, by contrast, there are fewer complex structures. Consequently, the author of 
this paper deems that if there is a relationship or connection among two norms that is inherent 
in their nature as norms, then an ordering and unification of norms into a normative order is not 
only possible, but actually seems necessary.  
What is more, according to the Stufenbau theory, the sources of international law in the legal-
positivism are interrelated to one another through two mainstreams such as externality, and 
coordination of sources.343 In the conception of the sources of international law, the externality 
of sources means that the sources are not norms or rules but they are beyond or outside law, 
either as entity or epistemic force – a tool for creation of interrelated norms by identical 
methods, mechanisms or procedures, which are regularly obeyed or are seen as being 
obligatory.344 As for the second mainstream, the coordination of sources means that the sources 
and subordinate sources of international law such as treaty and customary international laws, 
and certain resolutions of the UN Security Council, coexist together and they are coordinated 
to one another equally.345  
In addition, the aforementioned mainstream of the Stufenbau theory posits that except jus 
cogens norms, no hierarchy of sources exists, even though their creation is authorized by the 
UN Charter, which is one specific treaty.346 Therefore, the position of the coordinated sources 
is that one source or one of its resultant norms, does not influence the other source or its norms 
that they don’t derogate from each other.347  
However, the Stufenbau theory cannot solve all problems existing in international law though 
it will be able to spell out some of the implications for structural analysis of one specific part 
of the international legal order – the so called interrelationship of original sources of 
international law.348  
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Therefore, the mainstream of the Stufenbau theory states that treaty and customary international 
laws, and general principles of law are interrelated with one another in a way that they are part 
of the realm of facts and they are not dependent on higher law because of the original nature 
mentioned in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.349 Consequently, the interrelationship of the sources 
of international law under the Stufenbau theory comes at a price.  
However, applying the Stufenbau theory to international law brings great clarity to a traditional 
debate regarding the interrelationship of the sources in a legal order because of the following 
arguments:350  
First of all, a source of law is not an absolute, it is a part of the law and can appear anywhere 
within a legal order.351 Secondly, the Stufenbau theory constructs the relationship between 
sources of international law based on the externality of sources, coordination of norms and the 
mutual interdependence of sources.352  
Under the Legal-Positivist Tradition, the Stufenbau theory provides mutual interdependence of 
domestic law and international law. It gives the idea that domestic law can sometimes be 
interrelated with the source of international law through the general principles of law because 
they are results of the convergence of domestic rules and they are legal instruments in the 
capacity of international law.353 
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3 THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS WITH RESPECT TO AN INTERACTION OF 
A CUSTOM AND A TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
3.1 Challenges of identification of the jus cogens’ norms concerning interrelation of a 
custom and a treaty in international law 
In the previous chapter, the author of the paper attempted to find out whether a custom possesses 
superiority over a treaty in international law under the legal-formalist theory. Also, various 
approaches and traditions were analyzed in order to prove that custom had superiority over a 
treaty in international law. In the third chapter, the author will attempt to explore and find 
answers to the fourth research question stated in the introduction. The fourth research question 
concerns the application of the jus cogens’ norms by international courts when a custom 
hierarchically interrelates to a treaty in international law. Thus, the present chapter will explore 
such challenges as identification and application of the concept of jus cogens concerning an 
interaction of a custom and a treaty in international law.  
The concept of jus cogens is rooted in the writings of Vitoria, Grotius, Christian Wolff and 
Emmmerich de Vattel, who were the first to refer to certain rules which are superior to the 
customary or treaty-based rules of international law.354 Serious discussions are afoot regarding 
the identification of the norms of jus cogens. The most notable approach emphasizes that jus 
cogens’ rules are the product of the existing sources of international law and they derive from 
the interrelated process of the customary international law and general principles of 
international law.355 The source of peremptory rules in the writing of Vitoria’s era was natural 
law, while Hugo Grotius and Wolff relied on rationality though the sources of peremptory rules 
of international law were different for these authors.356  
Nevertheless, one common point amongst these doctrines is that this source is transcendental.357 
The following significant facts such as the prohibition against slavery and slave trade in the 19th 
century, as well as the first Geneva Convention of 1864 and the Hague Conventions on jus in 
bello can be indicated as crucial milestones in the identification and development of just cogens’ 
concept.358 However, the consolidation of jus cogens’ category of norms was going on after the 
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WWII and it was a product of the Charter of Nuremberg Military Tribunal and the Charter of 
the United Nations, which have led to a new era for the concept of jus cogens’ norms.359  
As a result, a certain concept of jus cogens’ norm was accepted in the Vienna Convention. 
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties gives the following definition to 
jus cogens: For the aims of the VCLT a jus cogens norm is admitted and recognized by states 
as a whole from which no derogation is allowed.360 For the identification of the norms as jus 
cogens, the degree of universality and non-derogability is a mandatory requirement.361 Non-
derogability is one of the factors that can be taken into account as a starting point for the 
identification of jus cogens’ norms.362 Moreover, the ICJ identified  jus cogens’ norms as 
intransgressible principles of customary international law.363 Furthermore, the ICJ stated that 
the rules of the humanitarian law in war have clearly acquired the status of jus cogens, from 
which no derogation is possible.364   
In addition, regarding the identification of jus cogens norms in light of the non-derogability, 
the ICJ’s advisory opinions hinted at jus cogens, as intransgressible principles of international 
customary law.365 Likewise, in the Oil Platforms case, where the original dispute between the 
parties related to the legality of the actions of the United States in light of international law on 
the use of force as self-defense, the USA argued that its military actions should be justified as 
measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the USA.366 The ICJ did not 
enter into discussion as to the question of whether the prohibition of the use of force militated 
in favor of a narrower interpretation, but resorted to Article 31(3.c) of the VCLT giving a 
permission to apply such norms of international law as jus cogens norms, for example, the 
prohibition of the unilateral use of force.367  
Consequently, the ICJ was guided by the customary international norm and concluded that the 
actions of the United States of America against Iranian oil platforms could not be justified as 
measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States of America 
and the USA’s actions could not be justified as self-defense.368  
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What is more, under non-derogability character, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
makes extensive use of the jus cogens arguments.369 Moreover, the IACtHR applies jus cogens 
norms as an argument to stress the grave character of certain human rights violations and to 
entail the obligation to prosecute and punish the perpetrators.370  
Furthermore, the IACtHR extended jus cogens obligations to the dimension of the duty to 
protect human rights, which requires States to take active measures in the field of legislation, 
litigation and enforcement.371 In addition, international criminal tribunals stressed the 
importance of certain offences such as the crime of genocide, sexual slavery, war crimes  and 
crimes against humanity entailing a duty to prosecute or extradite. For instance, in the 
Prosecutor v. Ruto and Sang case, where charges derived from the crimes against humanity, the 
ICC took into account the character of the peremptory charged norm and stated that the accused 
could not invoke privileges derived from his status as an elected official.372 
On the other hand, there are some challenges regarding the identification of jus cogens’ norms 
in the analysis of interrelationship among sources of international law. The first controversial 
issue is related to the meaning of general international law given in Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention.373 Some international law scholars apply this term to refer to customary 
international law, while others use it to signify sources of international law. However, the term 
“General international law” is applied for a specific body of rules applicable to a great number 
of states and it is composed of norms having a general applicability among the states of the 
international community.374 General international law encapsulates universal international law.  
The second controversial issue refers to the word combination written in the Art. 53 of the 
VCLT which can be read as the international community of States as a whole.375 The definition 
and understanding of this word combination are ambiguous. Some international law scholars 
clarify that the acceptance or recognition of all states is not imperative for the emergence of jus 
cogens norms and it is sufficient if the overwhelming majority of the international community 
makes such acceptance or recognition.376 Therefore, if this approach is accepted, then the VCLT 
and customary international law reflects a new method of law creation at the international level. 
For instance, Christos Rozakis, who is an author of the consensual character of jus cogens 
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norms, argues that international community of States as a whole hints at law creation via will 
of the majority and this phrase can be considered as a maker of jus cogens norms.377 
Furthermore, Rozakis concludes that Article 53 refers to norms of general international law and 
not to norms of universal law, thereby implying that a rule, which is accepted by consent of the 
majority of states in the international community may be recognized as a jus cogens norm.378  
Contrary to the aforementioned approach, other international law scholars do not share 
Rozakis’s opinions and argue that Article 53 of the VCLT characterizes jus cogens as requiring 
the consent of all states and not the majority of them in the international community.379 
However, Rozakis’ approach regarding the identification of jus cogens’ norms is a logical way 
of making jus cogens norms applicable to all States.380 
The third controversial question regarding the concept of jus cogens is related to its place in the 
international legal order. There is no exhaustive answer in legal literature, nor in international 
instruments, on whether customary international law is the only way of creating jus 
cogens rules or whether there are conventional sources also suitable for the task. There is 
nothing in the VCLT which prevents the use of conventional sources to express the acceptance 
and recognition concerning the jus cogens norm. Therefore, if no restriction exists regarding 
how the consent will be given, States should be free to use all mechanisms accessible to them 
and consequently acceptance and recognition of the norms such as jus cogens by States can take 
place via treaties as well as by way of custom.381  
In addition, the interrelationship between customary law and universal treaties does not hinder 
jus cogens norms to be considered as an independent source of international law and its place 
in the international legal order can be viewed from the custom and the treaty perspectives. Dr. 
Alexander Orakhelashvili supports a position of jus cogens norms from perspectives of 
customary law.382 For instance, Dr. Alexander Orakhelashvili treated the principle of non-
refoulment as a jus cogens norm, possessing the status of customary international law and 
elevated to jus cogens’ level.383 He argued that the principle of non-refoulement, which is 
codified in Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, is a firmly 
                                                          
377 C. L. Rozakis. The Jus Cogens’ Concept in the Treaty Law, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford: North Holland 
Publishing Company 1976, p. 80. 
378 Ibid., pp. 81-82. 
379 Ibid., p. 83. 
380 Ibid., p. 84. 
381 Y. Berkol, op. cit., p. 102. 
382 A. Orakhelashvili. Peremptory Norms in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 54. 
383 Ibid., p. 55. 
56 
 
established peremptory norm related to the rights of an individual derived from the customary 
international law.384  
The fourth controversial query regarding the identification of jus cogens norms refers to the 
qualified law-making procedure of jus cogens including certain attributes defining the special 
status of jus cogens’ norms. The law-making procedure of jus cogens norms is considered as a 
disputable issue because, as a well-known fact, in international law, there is no institutionalized 
law-making procedure that would have acquired a higher law-making capacity, though an 
exception may be the law-making activity of the Security Council in the field of international 
peace and security.385  
The author of this paper deems that at first, a potential peremptory norm ought to derive from 
the customary law, treaties or general principles of law, then it can be accepted by the majority 
of all States expressing their common consent, and this majority of States shall possess state 
practice and opinio juris toward that peremptory norm. After that, it can be elevated to the jus 
cogens’ part by common consent of the international community as a whole.386  
What is more, the author deems that majority of States, but not all states, suffice for a norm to 
be given a peremptory character. For instance, in 1968 at the UN Conference it was explained 
that in order for a norm to be accepted and identified as peremptory, a large number of States 
but not all States’ practice and opinio juris will be sufficient. It would mean that whether one 
State or a small group of States did not recognize a peremptory rule, it would not affect 
acceptance and identification of the jus cogens’ character norm by the international community 
as a whole.387  
Therefore, the author of the paper believes that identification of the jus cogens norms in the 
way that they may be given a special status in the interrelationship of sources of international 
law obviously would not depend on consistent state practice, but only on an opinio juris 
cogentis.388 
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3.2 Determination of values of the concept of jus cogens 
In international law the term “jus cogens” refers to norms that have peremptory authority 
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in 
the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general 
international norms of equivalent authority.389 The author of this paper supposes that the basic 
values of the concept of jus cogens with respect to interaction of a custom and a treaty in 
international law might be noticed in philosophical premises and methodologies of the views 
of scholarly protagonists.  
One of the fundamental values and effects of the concept of jus cogens is that its norms assist 
the international law in participation in the common good by securing a number of fundamentals 
referring to humanity and fulfilling some of the demands of practical reasonableness due to 
their authoritative character.390 Regarding the authoritative character of jus cogens norms, 
Alfred von Vedross commented that the authority of the norm stems from its relation to the 
moral task of the State and of the law.391 For instance, the authority of the jus cogens human 
rights norms secures the conditions necessary for flourishing such a fundamental value as 
human rights by protecting the ability of individuals to participate to create their common good 
and helping to fulfill a number of the demands of practical reasonableness.392  
In contrast with the aforementioned position, not all jus cogens norms can have their authority 
explained by reference to the common good. For example, there are certain peremptory norms, 
such as the rule of pacta sunt servanda - the authority of which cannot be understood in terms 
of protecting the common good, but rather by reference to its necessity to the continued 
effective existence of the international legal system.393 
An issue regarding other values and effects of the jus cogens’ norms in the interrelationship of 
the sources of international law is slightly controversial and there are different opinions among 
scholars of international law. According to one of the most prominent and prevailing views, the 
superiority character of jus cogens’ norms is one of its values and the existence of this value is 
also proved in the ECtHR’s Al-Adsani case, in which the judges recognized jus 
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cogens’ norms as a superior source of law.394 The Court added that jus cogens norms are such 
a fundamental and compelling law that they override all other principles of international law 
including the well-established principles of sovereign immunity.395 Besides, the Judgement of 
the ECtHR emphasized that the International Law Commission had found that States are not 
entitled to plead immunity or apply any other fundamental principle of international law in 
order to avoid responsibility in such cases where jus cogens’ character human rights are 
violated.396  
In addition, the ECtHR noted that the prohibition of torture, laid down in human rights treaties, 
enshrines an absolute right which can never be derogated from, not even in time of emergency, 
and that the prohibition of torture is a jus cogens character norm.397 Therefore, by that 
prohibition, this jus cogens’ norm protects such a fundamental value as human dignity in 
international law. Moreover, the jus cogens’ norm – the principle of prohibition of torture - is 
prescribed by Article 5 of the UDHR398 and Article 7 of the ICCPR.399 Regarding punishment 
of torture and other cruel treatment, the UN Convention, by Article 2, requires that states should 
take beneficial measures to prevent torture in their controlling territory.400 Also, by Article 4, 
the UN Convention prescribes that all acts of torture shall be made offences under the State 
party’s criminal law.401 
By the same token, there have been several judicial statements to the effect that the prohibition 
of torture attains the status of jus cogens and it provides for the protection of human dignity. 
For instance, in the judgment of Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) referred, inter alia, to the foregoing body of treaty 
rules and held that the principle of prohibition of torture has evolved into a jus cogens’ list of 
norms because it protects paramount values of human beings.402  
In addition, hypothetically, in the case of the so-called ticking bomb scenario, an order or even 
an obligation to torture a suspect in order to save lives cannot be legal because the prohibition 
of torture is absolute as is mentioned above in several court cases and it is not allowed under 
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any circumstances.403 As regards derogation from treaty obligations including hierarchically 
superior norms, it is established that when a norm of international law is compulsory, States are 
not allowed to conclude an international treaty without considering superior norms despite 
Article 4 of the ICCPR allowing states to make a temporary unilateral derogation from only a 
part of their treaty obligations.404  
In contrast, this fact refers to certain factual situations and derogation from the human rights 
treaty context can be considered as a typical exception, which is not contrary to Article 53 of 
VCLT because the prohibition of derogation in the second sentence of this Article is generally 
understood as referring to legal acts and rules, which fully or partially depart from the 
requirements of the jus cogens norms.405  
The reason why the exception of the allowed derogation from the treaty obligations including 
hierarchically superior norms in the human rights treaty context exists, is that in human rights 
law the interests of individuals are detached from the interests of States and are elevated to the 
international community in order to protect individuals against their states of nationality.406  
What is more, another fundamental value of the concept of jus cogens is that it serves the 
interests of weaker states. Based on Articles 64407 and 53 of VCLT the jus cogens’ norms 
prevent mighty states from entirely eclipsing the weaker ones by entering into agreements in 
order to gain exclusive dominance in international law.408  
In addition, the protection of general human rights at the national or international level can be 
considered as a value of this concept. For instance, it has been recognized by ICTY in the 
Furundzija case. In this case, the Trial Chamber held that at the inter-state level, the jus cogens 
concept serves to internationally delegitimize any legislative, administrative or judicial act 
which authorizes torture.409 Louis Henkin argued that the peremptory character of the jus 
cogens norm derives from their inherent rational and moral authority, possessing a moral force 
of unprecedented character.410  
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In international jurisprudence jus cogens is applied to signal that the norm reflects pivotal values 
for judges. For example, in the judgement of Congo v. Rwanda case the ICJ stated that the 
prohibition of genocide is endorsed as a norm deriving from the concept of jus cogens and 
Rwanda’s reservation to the Genocide Convention was invalid because of incompatibility with 
the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention.411 Meanwhile, the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights stated that  jus cogens norms include the principle of non-discrimination and 
the right to equal protection from torture, the right of access to justice, the prohibition of forced 
disappearance and the duty to prosecute a violation of jus cogens norms.412 
 
3.3 Application of jus cogens norms in the international legal practice 
The author of this paper thinks that international cases illustrate frequent practical application 
of jus cogens norms. These cases exhibit that judges frequently apply jus cogens principles 
because American statutory, constitutional, and customary law does not appear to address the 
issue or, if applied in their strict sense, they would yield unjust results.413 This is certainly the 
case referred to the prohibition of torture. For example, the United States has endeavored to 
provide a restrictive interpretation of torture for the purpose of allowing the use of particularly 
harsh interrogation techniques on terrorist suspects and providing broad defense to exempt State 
officials from criminal liability.414  
Having examined the international law cases, the author of paper thinks that the decisions of 
the ICJ and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights illuminate a conflict of applying 
jus cogens’ norms. For instance, in the Nicaragua case the Court applied the customary and 
general norms against the use of military force;415 The International Court of Justice decided 
that the United States had violated both jus cogens’ norms: the principle of prohibiting the use 
of force against another state and the norm of non-intervention.416 It was claimed that the 
prohibition against the use of force in international relations is jus cogens: the reason behind 
this was to support the existence of an independent norm of customary international law.417 
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Moreover, in a separate opinion, president Singh stated that the ICJ’s decision not to apply 
treaty law to the case, but rather to apply customary international law, which outlaws the use of 
force in international relations, emphasizes that the principle of non-use of force belongs to the 
realm of jus cogens.418 Besides, judge Sette-Camara stated that the non-use of force as well as 
non-intervention are not only cardinal principles of customary international law but could be 
recognized as peremptory rules of customary international law, which impose obligations on 
all states.419  
In addition, in the case of March 1987, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
decided that the United States had violated the right-to-life provision of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM) in allowing the execution sentences of 
James Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton.420 The Commission specifically found that a norm of jus 
cogens prohibits state execution of children in the OAS system.421  
The Commission found that in the Member States of the OAS, there was a recognized norm of 
jus cogens prohibiting the state execution of children which was accepted by all states in the 
inter-American system including the United States of America.422 It asserted that the provision 
of the right to life of the American Declaration contains an emerging prohibition against laws, 
permitting execution of juveniles.423  
Contrary to this assertion, the United States could not apply the principle of persistent objector 
of customary international law because the peremptory norm prevents such a defection. 
However, the only dissenting opinion was that a norm, prohibiting the state execution of 
children did not have approval internationally and accordingly, without approval of the 
international community as a whole, it was not a jus cogens’ norm.424 Therefore, the author of 
this paper thinks that the decision, by the IACHR in March 1987, illustrated a supervening 
effect of jus cogens norm on prior treaty and customary international laws for the following 
reasons:  
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Firstly, the Commission applied the supervening peremptory norm to interpret the Declaration 
on the Rights and Duties of Man and the interpretation sought consistency between the 
emerging new customary norm against executing juveniles and the jus cogens norm of the same 
content.425 Moreover, by applying a reinforced customary norm with a peremptory norm, the 
Commission found the United States in violation of the Declaration's right-to-life provision.  
Secondly, the Commission applied the supervening peremptory norm to prevent the United 
States from claiming the persistent objector exception to the development of an ordinary 
customary norm against the execution of juveniles.426 As regards the United States' claim of 
defection from a jus cogens norm, the Commission asserted that the countries of the Americas 
region, including the United States, had accepted the norm and explained that the case arose 
not because the United States denied the existence of the international norm prohibiting 
execution of children, but because no consensus existed regarding the age, at which the States 
may try juveniles as adults before criminal courts.427  
In that case the challenging issue was the application of jus cogens’ norms in their interpretation 
methods, i.e. the United States of America interpreted jus cogens norms erroneously and denied 
equal treatment of the minimum international standard of jus cogens by allowing the fifty States 
the discretion to sentence juveniles to death for capital crimes.428  
In that sense, the jus cogens concept plays an indispensable doctrinal role in distinguishing a 
mandatory standard from a discretionary regional standard that is contrary to the US approach 
according to which the USA prescribed execution of juveniles as a regional standard. After the 
USA denied the existence the rule of customary international law against executing juveniles 
by its unilateral objection, the concept of jus cogens undoubtedly and logically would have 
forced revision of that decision.429 
The application of the jus cogens human rights norms, as articulated by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, distresses the existing public order system of nation-States by 
intruding into the relationship between a state and its nationals.430 Such application faces the 
challenges such as the challenge of dissonance, the absence of coherence or communication 
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and the challenge of incommensurability.431 The incommensurability is the absence of a 
common basis for comparison in qualities such as value, size, or excellence.432  
The problem lies in the fact that the jus cogens normative system is incommensurable with the 
traditional states’ system.433 For instance, when the international Court of Justice and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights applied the jus cogens norms and made decisions 
against the United States, it challenged the entire international community with a complex 
choice.434 In effect, the decisions appeal to the international community as a whole to approve 
of dissonance introduced by a jus cogens norm, thereby forcing revision of the structure of the 
Nation-State law-making system.435 The solution was to shift the perspectives and loyalties 
from the Nation-State vision of community and public interest to the common one of survival 
of international society.436 This shift would escape the problem of incommensurability by 
creating a new standard of comparison beyond ordinary international law.437  
Besides, in that case the peremptory norm applied by the Commission on behalf of individuals 
in the Inter-American system would impose limitations on a powerful nation to prevent its 
dominance in resisting revision of a human rights norm.438 The Commission first raised the 
claim that the rule prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders had acquired the authority of 
jus cogens.439 However, the dissenting opinion was published, which preserved and reasserted 
the traditional means for determining the pedigree of a jus cogens norm, namely that the 
prohibition of the death penalty with respect to minors under 18 years of age is not a norm of 
jus cogens since it has not been accepted by the international community as a whole.440 The 
dissenting opinion also denied that there was violation of a norm of treaty or customary 
international law against executing juveniles.441  
Consequently, the author of the paper thinks that the application of jus cogens’ norms by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in a way like they were applied in the case of 
execution of juvenile442 fundamentally is in line with public morality and public order system 
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though it opposes the US approach that legalizes the juvenile death penalty in some of its States. 
Doctrinally, the dissent exposes vulnerable points in the Commission's reasoning though there 
is very little difference in the moral outcome between the United States' position about abuses 
of human rights in Latin American countries in relation to their own citizens and the 
Commission's stance for potential abuses by the United States.443 
In addition, in the case of Leng May Ma v. USA’s Immigration and Naturalization Service the 
United States Supreme Court held that Leng May Ma, a native and citizen of El Salvador, had 
presented a prima facie case for political asylum based on his assertion that he would face 
induction into military service in an army, which commits war crimes.444 The US Supreme 
Court concluded that the Salvadoran army violated Article 3 of the Geneva Convention by 
inhumane treatment of civilians, murder, torture and summary executions.445 Moreover, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees held that Leng May Ma had shown he would 
suffer disproportionately severe punishment on account of his refusal to serve in the army.446 
Therefore, the court unequivocally relied on and applied the jus cogens human rights norms, 
when such a judgment was made. 
Similarly, regarding the application of the jus cogens norms in the international legal practice, 
Nicaragua v. The USA is a perfect case for analysis in that sense. Thus, the research question 
arises whether the United States effectively invoked the concept of jus cogens in that case to 
justify the refusal to comply with Article 94 of the U.N. Charter. Regarding that query there are 
two approaches to justify the USA’s position: 
The first approach arguably supports the idea that the norm of the jus cogens quality invoked 
by the USA may be a fundamental argument to a nation-state system, which prohibits any 
derogation from the sovereignty principle of a state in order to survive the nation-State system 
and not to undermine good faith compliance with international agreements providing for 
international adjudication.447 The argument generally supports the idea that the nation-state’s 
action or inaction should comply with Article 94 of UN Charter in a way that the principle of 
sovereignty is not violated.  
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The second approach supports the position that the inherent right of self-defense, invoked by 
the USA in the case of the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, is a 
jus cogens norm justifying a broad interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter.448 Therefore, 
the broad interpretation of this norm may be read as the absence of effective Security Council 
action in response to breaches of the peace, the autonomy of a state or a region may be placed 
in jeopardy by external threats not amounting to an armed attack, and, in that case, application 
of the use of force as a self-defense may be justified.449  
In addition, for more clarification, the question is about keeping of the public order system to 
provide peace in a state or in a region as preserving the fundamental interest of the international 
society. For instance, Professor Rubin suggests, that the principle of self-defense as the norm 
of jus cogens derives from the negotiating history of the Kellogg-Briand pact.450 He also added 
that these justifications show how states may construct arguments, based on the application of 
the concept of jus cogens, to keep the public order to avoid abuse of power, which is frequently 
incommensurable with widespread and intense demands of the international society.451  
What is more, this case also exhibits that applying jus cogens norms as a guardian for 
fundamental interests of international society communicates the expectation that a public 
authority might be empowered to invalidate various treaty and customary provisions or norms 
in order to preserve the minimum consistency and order of the international public system.452 
The consequence of applying jus cogens norms in international practice is that the concept of 
jus cogens is invoked as a pure aspiration in order there to be a better system of restraint on the 
positive international law-making power of sovereign states.453  
Likewise, the case of the United States v. Toscanino is worth researching in respect of the 
challenges of the application of jus cogens norms in international legal practice. In the United 
States v. Toscanino the key query was whether the US Supreme Court would be guided by 
international law or the national law of the USA. Based on the principle of justice, the US 
Supreme Court applied the jus cogens norms and provided relief for an alien, who was tortured 
by the United States government agents in Uruguay, then was kidnapped by them and brought 
to the United States for the purpose of obtaining federal court jurisdiction over him.454 
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Moreover, the same court also found that international kidnapping violated the plaintiff's rights 
under the United Nations Charter, the Charter of the Organization of American States and 
customary international law for which the remedy was the return of the kidnapped victim.455  
In addition, in Fernandez v. Wilkinson case the US courts applied international law. This case 
concerned the misconduct of agents or officials of the United States government as well.456 The 
court found that indeterminate detention of a person in a maximum security prison, pending 
unforeseeable deportation, constitutes an arbitrary detention.457 Since the court could find no 
remedy under the United States’ constitution and by reason of the defendant's status as an 
excludable alien refugee, the court was guided by international law to find the solution.458 
As a result, the court failed to find any relevant domestic law and it relied on the principle of 
jus cogens to determine the applicable standard regarding the right to freedom from arbitrary 
detention.459 Therefore, the United States district court concluded that the existing customary 
international law prohibits arbitrary detention, and Mr. Fernandez’s detention had violated 
international law.460  
Also, the court added that the State of affairs, which resulted in the violation of the alien's 
fundamental human rights, was the abuse of discretion on the part of the responsible agency 
officials.461 In order for the court to determine the jus cogens norms, which derive from 
customary international law, the court considered numerous international sources, including 
United Nations instruments and declarations, multilateral treaties, various articles by legal 
scholars, and statements of members of the United States government.462   
Consequently, after analyzing these cases, the author of this paper thinks that the 
aforementioned cases illustrate frequent application of the jus cogens’ norms in the human 
rights violation cases in the practice of international and national legal systems. One of the 
reasons of the mentioned frequent application is promulgation of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and its subordinate international instruments. Moreover, after proclamation of 
those international instruments, the principles of jus cogens have started to develop their 
predominance in international and national legal systems.  
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Apart from the aforementioned conclusion, it may additionally state that the frequent 
application of the concept of jus cogens in human rights cases overcame the court-invoked 
barriers for remedy or compensation for wrong conducts or grievances and it should be a 
compelling factor in the progressive enforcement of human rights. Furthermore, the 
aforementioned cases exhibited that one of the main challenges of application of the jus cogens’ 
norms in the international legal system is various interpretations of the jus cogens’ norms by 
parties to international or national legal disputes, interpretations of which cause uncertainty or 
inaccuracy of meaning and application of the specific jus cogens’ norm. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The main conclusion of this study is that there is a hierarchy between custom and treaty in 
international law. This statement supports the theory that international law instruments are 
crafted through the essentially horizontal action, instead of vertical process. Based on the 
conducted research, the author of this paper supports the collectivist school’s approach, method 
of which and the ICJ’s practice are consistent with each other regarding the interrelationship of 
a custom and a treaty in international law.  
The aforementioned analysis conducted in the paper has revealed that when customary law 
hierarchically interrelates with treaty law, the ICJ The court classified the following three 
circumstances in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases: 
Firstly, the treaty may also be binding as a matter of customary law, whether or not the treaty 
is a codification of customs, or, if the treaty has crystallized emergent rules of customary law. 
In that sense treaties become sources of material or evidence in support of a potential rule of 
customary law. Secondly, a custom and a treaty can exist in parallel, and the ICJ declared that 
a custom and a treaty always exist simultaneously. Thirdly, some bilateral treaties have a feature 
to produce a customary rule and it is a process that has to be in consistence with the terms of 
Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute. Consequently, these three circumstances demonstrate that 
custom has a hierarchic interrelation with treaty in international law. 
The analysis carried out in the paper has revealed that the no-hierarchy concept of sources of 
international law is normatively problematic and misleading. As a result of the research, the 
author of the paper has come to conclusion that international law is a system of customary law, 
thus the author supports the custom primacy theory. It is substantiated that customary law 
mostly generates universally applicable norms. The customary law is seen as normatively 
superior over treaty law under the custom primacy theory. The legal-formalist theory posits that 
hierarchical approaches to customary international norms are developed in international legal 
practice as well. To some extent, this approach is applied in the international litigations by 
ICTY, SCSL and ICTY.  
The master’s thesis has exhibited that the customary law mirrors what is contained within 
treaties and the latter is reflective of what customary law is. The principle of state responsibility 
to uphold human rights is a lucid example of the interrelation of custom and treaty which 
prohibits violations of human rights against individuals and groups.  
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In the present paper, it has been explored and revealed that the Martens Clause from the 
preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention II is a prominent provision, which proves that a custom 
and a treaty have been in interrelation in light of protection of humanity. They are interrelated 
in regarding genocide. Their purpose lies in protection of human rights and avoiding the 
commitment of genocide as well. It has been stated that before the 1948 Genocide Convention, 
customary law had already prohibited unlawful acts concerning genocidal violence. Therefore, 
whether or not any party to a dispute attempts to ignore the 1948 Genocide Convention, in any 
case, international dispute settlement bodies will nevertheless apply relevant customary rules.  
Consequently, this approach proves that a custom is hierarchically superior to a treaty in 
international law. The present research has exhibited that the jus cogens’ norms serve the 
interests of weaker states by their superiority and authoritative character. International courts 
carefully, though frequently, apply the jus cogens’ norms in such disputes, when the customary 
international law interrelates with, crosses and collides with treaty law. 
The study has revealed that the alternative approach to the application of a custom and a treaty 
in international law derives from the restated doctrine of sources, which prescribes three main 
groups of sources. They include all norms of international law regardless of their origin, which 
are hierarchically arranged in legal system of international law and by which the problem of 
hierarchy among formal sources is solved. It erases distinctions between treaties and customs 
because it converts treaties from statements of the law to evidence of the law, where both serve 
as reflections of evidence of what international society has accepted as law. All three groups 
can be summarized as follows: 
The first category includes all core norms of international law originally originating from 
customary international law and treaty law. The first group includes the most superior and 
established norms of international law such as jus cogens norms and basic principles and 
standards of international law. It includes some of the oldest background principles of 
international law such as pacta sunt servanda and clausula rebus sic stantibus. It incorporates 
two different kinds of customary norms such as process values and internalized norms.  
The process values itself include factors, determinacy, predictability, and fair negotiating 
process, which make a particular agreed-upon rule legitimate. It includes the principle of 
consistency of agreed-upon rules as well as the principle of non-intervention and the clarity of 
agreed-upon enforcement mechanisms as well.  
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The second category includes all legitimated rules including various international treaties and 
ordinary customary rules of international law. In the second group all customary and treaty 
norms come from process-legitimacy and they make the international law more binding. Many 
international treaties are backed by strong process values, giving them more binding character, 
such as pacta sunt servanda and clausula rebus sic stantibus. The second group makes 
customary law a more official law in practice than it is now, based on the traditional doctrine 
of sources of international law.  
Thus, it comprises a group of recognized customary rules that are backed by strong evidence of 
general practice and opinio juris. The international courts have already started to employ such 
techniques. In the Nicaragua v. USA case the ICJ emphasized that the state’s acts must be 
accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitatis for a new customary rule to be found. 
The third category includes all aspirational norms of international law, which in turn include 
those rules described in treaties that have not yet been adopted as substantive norms in the 
international legal system. The aspirational norms of international law have a complete status 
of law and possess considerable political and moral force. The third group includes judicial 
decisions of international courts, writings of the most highly qualified publicists, aspirational 
norms, resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly, Security Council and international 
organizations, and major international conferences. The third group refers to and covers such 
norms that have not yet been internalized and remain largely aspirational, originating from a 
vague treaty backed by deficient process or such a treaty, which may be lacking in both process 
values and internalized norms. 
The abovementioned alternative approach to the application of the sources of international law 
encourages both those, advising states and those, acting on a state’s behalf to observe their 
actions as part of the process of international law-making. It provides an improved accuracy, a 
better picture of international law, governing the international system and suggests a deeper, 
more powerful understating of international law. Therefore, the aforementioned alternative 
approach proves that there is a hierarchy between customary law and treaty law. The customary 
law is hierarchically superior to the treaty law in the application of sources of international law, 
and Nicaragua v. the USA is an explicit example of this statement. 
In the present paper, it was found that the legal positivist theory defends the superiority of 
customary law and the interrelationship of sources of international law is expressed in a way 
that customary international law is treated as judge-made law with judicial pronouncements of 
customary legal norms. In the legal positivism, the Stufenbau theory is considered to be 
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significant. The Stufenbau theory, regarding the interrelationship of a custom and a treaty in 
international law, summarizes the following three significant statements: 
Firstly, customs and treaties have a hierarchical relationship in international law. Secondly, they 
are not separate from one another and their rules can change or influence the rules deriving 
from other sources. Thirdly, one hierarchically higher norm establishes the validity of another 
hierarchically lower norm, i.e. its existence as a norm.  
The Stufenbau theory also argues that there is a hierarchy between a custom and a treaty in 
international law. According to the Stufenbau theory, a custom and a treaty interrelate in the 
context of externality and coordinative mainstreams. Both mainstreams are explored and 
explained above.463 The mainstream of the Stufenbau theory states that treaty law and 
customary international law interrelate in the following way: they are part of the realm of facts 
and are not dependent on hierarchically higher disciplines of international law because of their 
originality mentioned in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.  
As a result, the Stufenbau theory constructs the relationship of sources of international law such 
as a treaty and a custom on the basis of externality of sources, coordination of norms and the 
mutual interdependence of sources. 
The concluding question put forward in the present research paper concerned how the jus 
cogens’ norms are applied by international courts in those circumstances when a custom 
interrelates with a treaty in international law. Regarding that, after analyzing a number of cases, 
the author of this paper states that the jus cogens’ norms are frequently applied and international 
practice demonstrates that mostly a custom interrelates with a treaty in human rights violation 
cases.  
In this interrelation jus cogens norms have the highest degree of universality and non-
derogability as a mandatory requirement. In the context of interrelation of a custom and a treaty 
in international law the jus cogens norms are identified as norms, having a special hierarchical 
status. A number of the ICJ cases reflect the superiority of the concept of jus cogens in the 
opinions of the ICJ judges. In international jurisprudence the jus cogens norms reflect pivotal 
values in the opinions of judges.  
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ABBREVIATION 
Art. – Article 
ADRDM - American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
BIT - Bilateral Investment Treaty 
ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR – European Court of Human Rights 
ICTR – International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
IACHR – Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICC – International Criminal Court 
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
ICJ – International Court of Justice 
NATO - The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization 
OAS – Organization of American States 
PCIJ – Permanent Court of International Justice 
p. – Page 
pp. – Pages 
para - Paragraph 
SCSL – Special Court for Sierra Leone 
UN – United Nations 
UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
USA – United States of America 
VCLT – Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
WTO - World Trade Organization 
WWII – The World War II 
UNSC – Security Council of the United Nations 
CIL – Customary International Law 
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